Leading the Inclusive City in Switzerland: Cooperation, Strategy, or Both?



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Introduction

Scholarly work on urban leadership is probably as old as research on cities itself. At the same time, the perception of city leaders' most relevant policy priorities regarding the main challenges and goals for the further development of cities have changed quite often. Yet even if urban regime theorists raised the issue of a wide range of possible policy agendas that can be pursued by city leaders together with a broad range of actors from business and civil society, most studies of the 1990s and early 2000s focused on cities and elite cooperation that had economic growth as the primary target of city development.

Whereas cities in the increasingly urbanised world are central to the creation of prosperity, it is also clear that even the wealthiest cities, including the so-called 'global cities', are nowadays facing rising socio-economic inequalities and challenges for integrating increasing flows of international immigration (for references, see Hambleton 2015, 4, or Fainstein 1010). Concurrently, globalisation has also led to increasing competition between cities at the national and global scale. It is thus questionable, whether city leaders have sufficient room to manoeuvre for choosing such social-centred priorities over market-centred priorities of urban development. Savitch and Kantor (2002) note that "Cities need not to be leaves in the wind" and emphasise the importance of urban leaders for mobilising broad political and public support within their municipality as well as financial support by higher state levels. Hambleton, in his book *Leading the Inclusive City*, draws the same conclusion: Cities are not just "helpless victims in a global process of economic exploitation designed to serve the capital needs" (Hambleton 2015, xii). What is needed, in his view, is strategic and cooperative leadership at the intersections between the political sphere, civil society and business interests.

In this paper we want to instigate the prospects of such visionary leadership for reaching a more just and more inclusive city. Based on a recent survey on Swiss mayors in Switzerland which is part of a broader survey of European mayors, we want to find out how mayoral leadership styles correspond to policy agendas that can be linked to socially just and inclusive cities.

We first give an overview over the theory regarding urban leadership and the just and inclusive city. Then we comment on the data and measures used, before reporting our empirical findings on the mayoral agendas in Switzerland and the predispositions for reaching an inclusive city in terms of mayoral leadership styles. We conclude with a discussion of the findings.

Theory: Leading the Inclusive City

City leadership is not a new topic among urban scholars. The power, interests, and leadership styles of mayors are part of scholarly writing at least since the community power debate of the 1960s (see, e.g. Bierschenk 2003; Dahl 1961; Hunter 1953), and gained new momentum in the 1990s with the rise of the urban regime approach (see, e.g. Mossberger and

Stoker 2001; Stone 1989). Most writings of urban regime theorists focus on various cities' growth agendas (see among others Crivelli and Dlabac 2006; Devecchi 2012; Digaetano and Klemanski 1993; Dowding et al. 1999; Hamilton 2002). It is however less well known that Clarence Stone was not only the leading founder of urban regime theory, but also one of the first urban scholars linking city leadership with political agendas that prioritise "environmental protection, historic preservation, affordable housing, (...) and linkage funds for various social purposes" (Stone 1993, 19) or agendas focusing on the expansion of lower class opportunities as enriched education and job trainings, better public transportation access and easier opportunities to start small businesses and home ownership. These all are political aims that went by more or less unnoticed by many scholars of the late 1990s and early 2000s working on city leadership and urban regimes, but are actually easily comparable to contemporary writing on just and inclusive cities (Fainstein 2009, 2010; Hambleton 2015; Harvey 1996, 2012; Marcuse et al. 2009; Soja 2010).

Fainstein's (2010) approach focuses on the 'Just City' as an analytical concept, but also as a political tool to lead and plan the Just City. Fainstein departs from a Rawlsian liberal concept of justice and discusses its applicability in the context of urban planning at the beginning of the twenty-first century in the wealthy, Western world. Equity, as her preferred criterion of justice, then refers to "a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (Fainstein 2010, 36). As this approach to justice can be criticized for being too individualistic, Fainstein supplements the criterion of equity with the poststructuralist criterion of recognition, giving attention to group differences that go beyond social classes and encompass race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and culture. She agrees with Iris M. Young that "group differentiation is both an inevitable and desirable aspect of modern social processes", and that "social justice ... requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression" (cited in Fainstein 2010, 43). Fainstein then amplifies her concept of justice by Sen and Nussbaum's capabilities approach. Necessary capabilities for the development of each individual encompass non-tradable and consciously valued (if not used) opportunities regarding quality of life, health, bodily integrity, access to education and control over one's political and material environment (Fainstein 2010, 55).

For the assessment and guidance of Just City planning and policies, Fainstein (2010, 68-82) proposes a series of substantive criteria in a range of policy domains (also see Carpenter, Dlabac, and Zwicky 2015). With regards to housing policies she problematizes US urban sprawl caused by incentives for house ownership and stigmatisation of low-income occupants in public housing, pleading for the more recent trend towards mixed-income developments and non-profit or cooperative forms of housing in the case of Europe. More generally, she observes repetitive conflicts between growth and equity, as is often exemplified in the field of urban regeneration and zoning policies: 'downtown versus the neighbourhoods', 'demolition versus preservation', 'community stability versus population

change', 'subsidized sports facilities versus investments in social housing, education, or community facilities', 'expressways versus public transit'.

Taking into account Fainstein's approach on just cities, Hambleton (2015), in his analysis of leadership focuses on the concept of the 'Inclusive City'. He wishes to expand Fainstein's work with the focus on social justice through notions of *environmental* justice and sustainability (Hambleton 2015, 21-25). According to Hambletons definition, inclusive cities are cities that are pushing forward eco-friendly policies and approaches, as well as being cities that are people-friendly and that take advantage of diversity (Hambleton 2015, xiv). Hambleton additionally criticises the contemporary praise of 'smart cities' as sustainable, technologically advanced alternatives to cities that prioritise economic growth. Being smart is, according to Hambleton, not enough to achieve social integration, environmental justice and sustainability; it is thus necessary to develop 'wise cities' (Hambleton 2015, xiv/283).

In order to address pressing societal and environmental challenges, inclusive cities need, following Hambleton's argumentation, not so much managers for preserving and incrementally improving public services, as was the case under large public administrations and remains the case after outsourcing public services and introducing New Public Management techniques (Hambleton 2015, 58-63). In the context of the shift from government to 'governance', where responsibility for collective provision of services is diffused across a variety of public, private, and community and voluntary sector bodies, radical change in the kind and organisation of public services instead requires "bold, forward looking leadership" (Hambleton 2015: 11). "Out goes the notion of the 'city boss' determining policies and priorities; in comes the 'facilitative leader' orchestrating the efforts of multiple actors" (Hambleton 2015, 11). Thereby city leadership stems from three relevant groups: 1) political leaders (mayor and politicians), 2) civil society leaders and 3) business/economic leaders. Productive spaces of innovation result where these three spheres of leadership overlap (Hambleton 2015, 125). Effective leaders must therefore reach out and cooperate with stakeholders from the other relevant spheres (Hambleton 2015, 124) - an approach that is in strong accordance with earlier urban regime writings.

Summing up Hambleton's argument, city mayors that want to engage in political decisions leading to an inclusive and wiser city need to have a clear policy strategy and have to be inclusive in a cooperative way. Hambleton (2015) highlights innovative 'inclusive city'-projects that show the potential of a democratic, cooperative and strategic city leadership in 17 cities around the globe. Rather than only looking at positive examples, where cooperative and strategic leadership advances the inclusive city, we are interested whether such leadership is also more generally associated with the goals of a more inclusive and more just city. More specifically, we focus on the political sphere of urban leadership.

To do so, we take advantage of Getimis' and Hlepas' (2006) work. According to them, and following a wide strand of literature on political leadership (see further Barber 1977; John and Cole 1999), the core dimensions of leadership style refer to the leadership predispositions and the leaders attitudes towards the exercise of power. The first dimension "reflects the way in which leaders envisage their role" (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 179),

resulting in the dichotomy between 'strategic' and 'reproductive' leadership styles. Strategic city leaders hence develop and pursue distinctive and novel policy agendas and try to institutionalise them in the city's policy making. Reproductive mayors do not design long-term agenda goals, and tend rather to orient themselves at the reproduction of ideas that are already present in the administration. The second dimension of leadership that is geared towards the attitudes towards the way mayoral power is exercised leads to another dichotomy – namely towards a 'cooperative' and an 'authoritarian' style of leadership. Whereas cooperative leaders try to mobilise as much community support as needed to "get the municipal work done, (...) authoritarian leaders are characterised by a top down approach of command and control" (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 181).

Figure 1: Four Ideal leadership styles (Source: Getimis/Hlepas 2006: 182, based on John/Cole 1999)

| | | Leadership orientation Reproductive Strategic | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|---------------|---|-----------|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Exercise of power | Cooperative | Consensus Facilitator | Visionary | | | | | | |
| | Authoritarian | Protector | City Boss | | | | | | |

Following John and Cole (1999) and combining these two dimensions, Getimis and Hlepas (2006, 182-183) create a typology that includes four different ideal leadership styles (see Figure 1):

- 1. 'Visionary leadership': Visionary mayors act pro-active, are change oriented, and mostly belong to a long-lasting leadership period based on powerful and effective coalitions.
- 2. 'Consensus Facilitator leadership': Consensual mayors lead in an open way that makes it possible to incorporate agenda aims introduced by their cooperation partners. The establishment of long lasting strategies can somewhat be challenging for such mayors, because third-party agenda aims can change rapidly.
- 3. 'City Boss leadership': City boss mayors are characterised mainly by their unilateral decisions concerning the local policy agenda that bases on strategic and long-term visions. Such leaders use the mayoral power vested in the politico-administrative system.
- 4. 'Protector leadership': Protective mayors do not aim to participate in cooperative coalitions and tend to show problems in coping with policy changes. Maintaining the status quo is the most important issue for such mayors.

Even though strategy and cooperation – as also included in Hambleton's (2015) approach on 'Inclusive Cities' – are two well-known concepts among scholars working on urban leadership, Getimis and Hlepas (2006, 178, emphasis by the authors) refer to a "knowledge gap regarding the *policy outcomes* of enacted leadership". Our literature review has not

revealed any advancement in this regard since then. Most of the already realised studies focus on institutional or personal factors that result in different leadership styles, but not in policy outcomes. We thus try to fill this gap with our analysis on Swiss cities. As the data available does not allow us to account for actual policy outputs and outcomes, the focus on self-reported mayoral agendas can already produce important insights.

What then do we expect from these theoretical statements? Which leadership styles could serve as a predisposition to a mayoral agenda towards inclusive Swiss cities? Taking into account Hambleton's (2015) argumentation of the need for cooperative and strategic leadership leading to 'wise' cities, it would be visionary mayors that engage most in policy agendas that can be linked to the 'Inclusive City'. Getimis and Hlepas (2006) also point at visionary leaders that are more prone to innovative policies than leaders of all other types. On the opposite, protective mayors can be assumed to be the most likely antagonists towards inclusive and eco-friendly agenda goals. This assumption is not taken because such mayors do not want to implement such goals in general, but rather because they are not engaging in either strategic or cooperative ways of even thinking about such agenda goals to be important for their cities.

Important to notice is the quite probable possibility of visionary mayors that act in a strategic and cooperative way, but are not geared towards policy agendas that could be the basis for 'Inclusive Cities'. When considering the vast amount of scholarly work on urban regimes as successful cases for the establishment of economic development agendas, Hambleton's (2015) positive examples tend to draw a too optimistic picture. Hambleton himself opens his book with the acknowledgement that it may have a "bias for hope" (Hambleton 2015, 3). Indeed, he has selected inspiring cases of mayoral city leadership fostering social and eco-friendly projects, i.e. policies and projects that are typically at the heart of inclusive cities. Visionary mayors with stronger ties to private capital and economic growth agendas can however use their shared power of public, civic, and private leadership to enact agenda goals and implement policies that prioritise for example gated community housing over social housing projects, special economic areas and their profit possibilities over innovative and green industrial parks, or lower taxes for the well-off over redistributive and integrative social measures. Such agendas and policies can lead to the opposite of what Hambleton has in mind when talking about inclusive cities, because they can lead to even more exclusionary cities, degraded areas, inequalities of life chances and consequently a worse quality of life for many inhabitants.

Data and Method

Getimis and Hlepas (2006) based their empirical assessment of urban leadership styles across twenty European countries on the European Mayor Survey conducted in 2004. Switzerland stood out there as one of the countries where the mayors – who are directly elected by the citizens, together with their colleagues in the collegial executive – most often displayed consensual traits (Getimis and Hlepas 2006, 186).

Our paper builds on the second wave of the European Mayor Survey that is currently being conducted in 30 European countries (2015-2016), but for which we have already succeeded to collect the Swiss data. We contacted all cities with more than 10'000 inhabitants or being members of the Association of Swiss Cities (Schweizerischer Städteverband) and received answers from 112 mayors out of 167 (response rate: 67%).

For assessing the leadership styles of Swiss mayors, we followed Getimis and Hlepas (2006) approach and where possible we used the same items for calculating the mayoral attitudes on the reproductive-strategic and on the authoritarian-cooperation dimension (see appendix II, Q1). For the first dimension we thus included four items covering whether mayors set goals for transforming the administrative structure, and if they ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process (reproductive); and whether mayors encourage new projects in the community, and if mayors guide the staff in day to day activities (both strategic). For the latter dimension we had to rely on only two rather than four items: We included the items covering whether mayors foster the cooperation with the neighbouring municipalities (cooperative), and whether they manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices (authoritarian). Arguably, these two items capture the central meaning of the dimension (cooperation vs. implementing personal policy agenda), even without taking into account Getimis and Hlepas (2006: 181) additional items that cover the questions whether authoritarian mayors were likely to give priority to 'formal power and authority', and whether cooperative mayors prefer to motivate their staff through commendation and reward. Additionally, the dimensions were dichotomised by using the average of the Swiss mayors as cleavage point.

Since the measures for leadership style say little about the interaction specifically with citizens and groups, we complement these measures by using the mayors' indication of time spend at meetings with these actors as a share of hours spent at other activities (appendix II, Q9).

For the dependent variable regarding the inclusive city agenda, we equally relied on the indications given by the mayors (Q3). Since some mayors might have given high priorities across the board of possible agenda priorities, while others were more restrictive, we opted for a standardisation by calculating the percentual weight a mayor gave to the single agenda priorities.

Since mayoral agenda priorities will heavily depend on the political position of a mayor, we also revert to the mayoral self-positioning between left and right (appendix II). For constructing subsamples based on political orientation, we used values from zero to six for centre-left, whereas seven to 10 was coded as an orientation towards the political right position.

As further conditioning variables we used the mayoral assessment of the financial situation (Q14) as well as structural data on population size and type of municipality (core city vs. other types) from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office.

The Mayoral Political Agenda in Swiss Cities

The evaluation of the policy agendas shows that Swiss city mayors are in general not so much concerned about topics regarding the just and inclusive city (figure 2). Even centre-left mayors (left panel) give more priority to stimulating economic growth and employment, improve communal infrastructure and increasing the attractiveness of the municipality for business and living, than to social policies, integration and environment. Still, compared to right-wing mayors (right panel) they are clearly more preoccupied with these latter priorities, unsurprisingly the gap being largest with regard to integration.





Figure 2: Political agenda of Swiss city mayors, centre-left vs. right political orientation, 2015

(*Remarks*: Individual mayors could ascribe each item a priority from 1 to 5. These values were standardised for each mayor item to represent the share of priority points from the total of points ascribed by a particular mayor. Values shown represent the respective average share of priority across all mayors with centre-left respectively right political orientation.)

Interesting differences based on the political standing of mayors can also be found in the particular field of housing policies (figure 3). Centre-left mayors are more spread on the question whether markets are the best way for attending housing needs, but they tend to be indecisive or even contradict such an assumption. Right-wing mayors, in contrast, generally agree to the statement.

Figure 3: Agreement with the sentence "The market is the best way to attend housing needs", centre-left vs. right-wing Swiss mayors, 2015




Leadership Styles Associated with the Inclusive City Agenda

Before turning to the empirical analysis of the relationship between leadership styles and the inclusive city agenda, let us map the Swiss cities in terms of mayoral leadership styles (figure 4). The Swiss average value is indicated with the vertical and horizontal reference lines in the figure. Since we use these values as thresholds for assigning the Swiss cities to the fourfold typology of leadership styles, we find the visionary cities in the top right quadrant, clockwise followed by the cities governed by a city boss, a protector, or a consensus facilitator. The comparison of the subset of cities governed by centre-left as compared to right-wing mayors shows that mayors at both sides of the political spectrum pursue all different types of leadership styles, with no clear pattern in that regard (the darker the dots, the more cities expose these precise values).

When turning to the statistical regressions of agenda priorities on leadership styles (table 1), we would first like to highlight the important role of the mayor's political orientations, confirming our observations from figure 3. Mayors leaning towards the right clearly tend to give economic growth a higher priority than their more leftist colleagues (model 4). They are also more convinced about the marked solving their housing needs, whereas mayors leaning more towards the left are more sceptical of these views (model 5). In contrast, centre-left mayors are significantly more concerned with developing social policies, social integration, and preserving the environment (models 1-3). If we want to estimate the effect of leadership styles, it is thus crucial to control for this variable. The effects found are then to be interpreted under the *ceteris paribus* condition, i.e. it holds for mayors and cities with similar traits. In this vein, we can also see that financially better situated cities tend to give less importance to growth and the prevalence of market mechanisms when it comes to housing.





With regard to leadership styles, contrary to the general expectation, we found that in the Swiss context visionary mayors cannot be associated with agendas towards inclusive cities. Quite to the contrary, it is the city boss and the consensus facilitator, who set themselves apart from visionary leaders by supporting inclusive city priorities. In our models, we therefore use the visionary leadership style as reference category and check what it means for the city agenda to be less cooperative (city boss), less strategic (consensus facilitator), or neither cooperative nor strategic (protector).

On the one hand side, it is the *consensus facilitator* mayors who - ceteris paribus - tend to prioritise policy agendas geared towards integration (model 2), significantly more so than visionary mayors (reference category). This means that they prioritise integrating ethnic, religious and cultural minorities and fostering diversity and tolerance goals over other issues such as public safety, preserving the local identity, expanding local infrastructure or addressing politico-administrative issues - agenda goals which are not primarily connected to the ideal of inclusive and just cities. An even stronger predictor of an integration-friendly agenda is the reported time share a mayor spends at meetings with citizens and groups. A closer look at the subsamples of centre-left and rightist mayors (see additional regression table in appendix I, model 3-4) reveals that it is particularly right-wing mayors who are more sensitised when they are in close contact with citizen groups. While this effect holds for integration policies, with regard to the other domains we find no evidence for an effect of citizen interaction. We can however find an additional effect for centre-left mayors with regard to social policies, and it is again the consensual leadership style having positive impact (see appendix I, model 1). For centre-left mayors, a consensual leadership style thus not only favours a focus on integration, but also on securing social policies more broadly, such as housing, education, and carrying for vulnerable groups in general.

Table 1: Regression analysis for the mayoral agenda

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------------|---------------|-------------|--------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| | Social policie | s Integration | Environment | Econ. growth | Housing | | | |
| | OLS | OLS | OLS | OLS | logistic | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | | | |
| y> =Disagree | | | | | 1.7 | | | |
| | | | | | (3.1) | | | |
| y>=Neither agree nor disagree | | | | | 0.4 | | | |
| | | | | | (3.1) | | | |
| y>=Agree | | | | | -1.3 | | | |
| | | | | | (3.1) | | | |
| y>=Strongly agree | | | | | -3.8 | | | |
| | | | | | (3.2) | | | |
| Leadership style: | | | | | | | | |
| - City Boss | 1.3 | 0.9 | -0.2 | -2.9*** | -1.3* | | | |
| | (1.0) | (0.8) | (0.9) | (0.9) | (0.8) | | | |
| – Consensus facilitator | 0.9 | 1.2* | 1.0 | -0.9 | -0.1 | | | |
| | (0.8) | (0.7) | (0.8) | (0.8) | (0.6) | | | |
| -Protector | 0.2 | 0.4 | 0.2 | -0.9 | 0.2 | | | |
| | (0.8) | (0.6) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.6) | | | |
| – Visionary (reference category) | | | | | | | | |
| Meetings with citizens / groups | 0.01 | 0.1** | -0.003 | -0.02 | 0.02 | | | |
| | (0.1) | (0.05) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.04) | | | |
| Left-right self-positioning (0-10) | -0.4** | -0.5*** | -0.4** | 0.2* | 0.5*** | | | |
| | (0.2) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | | | |
| Good financial situation | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.6 | -1.2** | -1.0** | | | |
| | (0.6) | (0.5) | (0.6) | (0.6) | (0.5) | | | |
| Core city | -0.9 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.3** | -0.2 | | | |
| · | (0.7) | (0.5) | (0.6) | (0.6) | (0.5) | | | |
| Population (ln) | 0.3 | 0.2 | -0.03 | 0.4 | -0.2 | | | |
| • | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.4) | (0.3) | (0.3) | | | |
| German-speaking | -0.8 | 0.8 | -0.2 | -0.3 | 1.2** | | | |
| | (0.7) | (0.6) | (0.7) | (0.7) | (0.5) | | | |
| Constant | 10.2** | 8.3*** | 12.4*** | 7.8** | . , | | | |
| | (4.0) | (3.1) | (3.7) | (3.7) | | | | |
| Observations | 78 | 78 | 78 | 78 | 81 | | | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | | | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | | | | |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 68) | 2.5 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 2.3 | | | | |
| F Statistic (df = 9; 68) | 1.9* | 4.0*** | 1.7 | 2.6** | | | | |
| chi ² | | | | | 39.6*** (df = | | | |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Cities led by *city bosses*, on the other hand, show a tendency to set political agendas that are less concerned with economic growth (see Table 1, model 4). At the same time, city bosses also seem to be less convinced that the market can solve the most important housing issues (model 5). Compared to other leaders, city bosses thus seem to be less inclined to subordinate their agenda to the logic of national and international market competition, and they thus take a more positive stance towards local political intervention for attending housing needs (e.g. public/cooperative housing), which is pretty much in accordance to the Just City agenda. When we again look at our subsamples (see appendix I, model 9), we observe that it is mainly the centre-left city bosses driving the negative effect on 'free housing markets'. Interestingly, with regard to the economic growth priority, the effect seems to be mainly driven the right-wing city bosses (model 8). These take a significantly more relaxed view on the growth imperative as compared to their right-wing colleagues displaying other styles of leadership.

Conversely, and against the hopes nurtured by Hambleton (2015), *visionary* mayors combining both cooperative and strategic traits give significantly less priority to integration than consensual mayors that are cooperative but are more oriented towards reproduction than strategic change. Together with consensual and protective leaders, visionary leaders are clearly more supportive of stimulating growth and leaving housing needs to be solved by the market as compared to city bosses (models with city boss style as reference category not reported here). Lastly, mayors exemplifying the *protector* leadership style, besides being progrowth like their consensual and visionary colleagues, stand out in their particular reliance on the market for attending housing needs (models with city boss style as reference category not reported here).

To sum up, rather than finding evidence for the visionary leadership style to be more conducive to the inclusive city, we found that the more reproductive orientation of the consensual facilitator has a positive impact on priorities geared towards integration and social services, whereas city bosses tend to be less growth- and market-oriented. Different styles thus priorising different aspects of the just and inclusive city. No evidence could be found, however, for a superiority of any leadership style with regards to environmental goals, the aspect that Hableton (2015) wished to include to his concept of an 'Inclusive City'.

Discussion: Cooperative or Strategic Leadership towards Inclusive Cities?

In the introduction, we set out with the notion that city leadership styles and urban political agendas are commonly investigated as one ensemble. Yet we observed the relative absence of empirical studies on leadership and regime building geared towards inclusive, integrative, and redistributive policy agendas in the 1990s and early 2000s. Only recently, authors like Marcuse et al. (2009), Fainstein (2010), or Hambleton (2015) restarted the discussion on just and inclusive cities. We took this newly launched research avenue as a motivation to investigate mayoral agendas in Swiss cities, and more in detail which of four different city

leadership styles result in urban policy agendas that embrace the most important elements defining just and inclusive cities, i.e. social integration and welfare issues, protection of the environment, state controlled housing markets or policies leading towards a limited growth of the city.

Our results show that Swiss cities which care for policy agendas promoting an inclusive and just city are either led by cooperative and reproductive leaders – i.e. leaders belonging to the consensus facilitating style of leadership – or by authoritarian and strategic leaders that belong to the city boss category respectively. Leaders of the visionary (cooperative and strategic) and protector type (neither cooperative nor strategic) tend not to prioritise agenda issues that are critical for inclusive and just cities.

There are however differences between the two leadership styles fostering inclusive city goals: Whereas cities with consensual mayors pursue agenda goals fostering integration, diversity and tolerance, cities with city boss leaders tend to prioritize either agenda goals leading to limited growth or to housing markets that are under a stronger control by the state. With a closer look on the political orientation of their leaders, we observe an additional positive impact of the consensual leadership style on social and welfare state issues in cities governed by centre-left mayors. The look at the political orientation of the mayors also brings a better understanding for the effect of the city boss style: with regard to housing intervention it is particularly the centre-left city bosses who deviate from their centre-left colleagues exposing other leadership styles; whereas with regard to limited growth agendas it is particularly the right-wing city bosses who deviate from their right-wing colleagues who display other styles of urban leadership.

What can we learn from these results? First and foremost we see that inclusive city agendas are only observable in cities led by consensus or city boss mayors. That means that only cities that are led either in a cooperative and reproductive or in an a strategic and authoritarian manner include just city elements in their political agenda. Visionary Swiss cities thus tend to set policy agendas that are mainly geared towards non-intervention in housing markets and towards economic growth; a finding that confirms that Hambleton (2015) might indeed be biased for hope when encouraging more visionary urban leadership for achieving a more inclusive city.

Secondly, integrative and social welfare state agenda goals need a leadership style based on cooperative elements to be pursued in Swiss cities – and the latter additionally a centre-left mayor. One possible explanation for that phenomenon is the need for cooperative collaboration with the political forces needed to defend present local integration and welfare programmes against the right-wing interests that are gaining political strength not only in suburban and rural areas, but also in many, mostly smaller and medium sized Swiss cities. Another reason for inclusive and social agenda goals that emerge together with a reproductive leadership style can be the mayor's recognition of their political limits when it comes to additional development of inclusive political aims (as e.g. anti-growth strategies or state controlled housing) and thus want to reproduce their city's social status quo after all.

A third lesson from our results is the sole appearance of anti-market ideas in combination with the authoritarian and strategic city boss leadership style. We interpret these results with the novelty of such ideas compared to the more common economic development ideas. Political claims that the market is not suited for organising housing in an appropriate way, or the idea of pursuing a political agenda that is not primarily focused on constant growth can thus only be made within a leadership style that bases on authority and strategy. The mayoral leadership needs to be authoritarian because cooperation would lead to conflicts with other, more conservative political forces or private market interests, and it needs to be strategic because such new ideas can only be developed by mayors that are able to think strategically and out of the box.

We add a last comment concerning the right-wing city boss mayors fostering a political agenda that is not focused on economic growth. On the one hand, right wing mayors that prioritise a certain preservation of the status quo are quite easily imaginable. Thus, policy agendas towards limiting economic growth, or agendas that at least do not prioritise economic growth, are not that surprisingly taken by right-wing politicians. More interesting is the fact that there seems to be a need for strategic visions to enforce such a vision, what can be traced back to the strong predominance of contemporary liberal growth ideas. On the other hand, this result can be additionally interpreted in relation to the selfperception of right-wing mayors when it comes to the description of their job profile. Elsewhere (see further Devecchi forthcoming 2016), we observed a strong narrative construction of strong and authoritarian city leadership (à la 'L'état c'est moi!') with the type of leadership which can be found predominantly in small and middle-sized enterprises. Leading a city in such a way may foster mayoral power in enforcing 'alternative' visions of limited growth. These consideration leads us to the thought that in contrast to Getimis' and Hlepas' (2006) definition of protective and city boss leadership, today's actual preservation of the social, environmental and economic status quo can only be accomplished in cities led by strategic city bosses. Mayors that fall under the term of protectors because of lacking cooperative and strategic behaviour, would at least in the Swiss case better be termed 'maintenance' mayors securing minimal public services and being to great extent dependent on private investment and initiative, which would correspond to an unfavourable 'dependent private bargaining context' for the public sector vis-a-vis business actors (Savitch and Kantor 2002).

Finally, we want to speculate about the possibilities how Swiss mayors caring about the just and inclusive city could successfully expand their agendas to make their city even more inclusive and just, i.e. with the prospects of adapting their leadership style by becoming both, strategic and cooperative. Such a shift in leadership style would let cities now led by conensual, and city boss leaders become 'alternative' visionary cities. This is to say because contemporary visionary cities in Switzerland generally opt, according to our results, for a policy agenda that is mainly based on neoliberal growth ideas. Their mayors thus do not use their cooperative and strategic leadership power to embrace broad inclusive policy agendas. We however argue that only cities that already pursue at least parts of the

inclusive city agenda are to be expected to develop them even broader in a sense that would fit Hambleton's (2015) definition. This means that Swiss consensual mayors could incorporate the present agenda goals of their city boss counterparts with becoming more strategic, just as city bosses could extend their inclusive agenda when becoming more cooperative. The 'alternative' visionary mayor would thus incorporate integrative and social policies, as well as state controlled housing programmes, and policies that limit growth.

Here the difficult question remains how, and whether at all Swiss consensual or city boss mayors can get momentum to gear their cities towards an even broader inclusive policy agenda. In particular, a closer interpretative look at cities belonging to the city boss-category can unravel their available possibilities to become more cooperative, and thus could strengthen their potential of generating stronger 'alternative' visions for integrative and social policies. To reach such goals, contemporary authoritarian leaders need to try to intensify new forms of local or inter-municipal cooperation. These could be established with the incorporation of local grassroots movements that share alternative visionary ideas, as e.g. housing cooperatives that are seeking land to build up integrative, innovative and cheaper forms of social housing which are better accessible for the less well-off. The establishment of such new cooperations are easily conceivable for centre-left mayors, whereas their emergence under right-wing mayors is less probable – even if right-wing politicians and alternative cooperatives could find each other in seeking solutions for a similar goal, namely the preservation of the status quo.

On the other hand, Swiss cities led in a consensual style need a stronger strategic approach towards an anti-growth agenda and stronger interventionist housing policies to complement their integrative and social policy measures already set on the mayoral agenda. For smaller cities led by cooperative, but only reproductive leaders, it would be one possible option to increase the professionalisation of the local politico-administrative institutions, what can lead to broader and more strategic ways of local decision processes (in relation to professionalisation and local planning see Devecchi forthcoming 2016). A second option to foster strategic leadership – that would also be valid for bigger, and already professionalised cities – could be the widening of the already broad cooperation with surrounding municipalities, the establishment of inter-municipal learning processes, lobbying towards a stronger institutionalisation of regional political bodies (in relation to the effect of more professionalised regional/metropolitan institutions see Sager 2005), or strategic cooperations with other archetype cities in similar situations.

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Appendix I: Additional regression table

Table 2: Regression analysis for the mayoral agenda, centre-left vs. right political orientation

| | Dependent variable: | | | | | | | | | | |
|--|--|---------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------|------------------------|--------------------|------------------------|------------------|--|
| | Social policies Integration Environment Econ. growth | | | | | | | | Housing | | |
| | C | DLS | OLS | | 0. | LS | OLS | | logistic | | |
| | (1) Centre- left | (2) Rightist | (3) Centre- left | (4) Rightist | (5) Centre- left | (6) Rightist | (7) Centre- left | (8) Rightist | (9) Centre- left | (10) Rightist | |
| y> =Disagree | | | | | | | | | -4.3 | 0.7 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (4.8) | (6.6) | |
| y>=Neither | | | | | | | | | -6.1 | -0.1 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (4.8) | (6.6) | |
| y>=Agree | | | | | | | | | -8.2* | -1.9 | |
| | | | | | | | | | (5.0) | (6.6) | |
| y>=Strongly | | | | | | | | | -11.4** | -4.4 | |
| agree | | | | | | | | | (5.2) | (6.6) | |
| Leadership style: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| - City Boss | 2.0 | 1.2 | 1.4 | 0.9 | -2.1 | 0.3 | -1.7 | -4.1*** | -4.3*** | -0.3 | |
| | (1.2) | (1.7) | (1.0) | (1.3) | (1.2) | (1.5) | (1.3) | (1.5) | (1.4) | (1.2) | |
| - Consensus | 2.3** | 0.3 | 1.0 | 1.2 | 0.9 | 0.6 | -1.1 | -1.1 | -1.7 | 0.03 | |
| facilitator | (1.0) | (1.3) | (0.9) | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.2) | (1.1) | (1.1) | (1.2) | (0.8) | |
| - Protector | 0.6 | -0.2 | -0.2 | 0.5 | -1.1 | 1.2 | 0.5 | -2.0* | -0.6 | -0.2 | |
| | (0.9) | (1.2) | (0.8) | (1.0) | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.0) | (1.1) | (1.0) | (0.8) | |
| - Visionary (reference category) | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Meetings with | 0.1 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2** | -0.02 | 0.04 | -0.1 | 0.02 | -0.03 | 0.1 | |
| citizens/groups | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | (0.1) | |
| Left-right | -0.9*** | 0.7 | -0.2 | -0.3 | -0.5 | -0.5 | 0.6 | 0.2 | 0.8** | 0.9* | |
| selfpos.: 0-10 | (0.3) | (0.6) | (0.3) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.6) | (0.4) | (0.5) | (0.4) | (0.5) | |
| Good financial | -0.6 | 1.0 | 0.3 | 0.3 | -0.1 | 1.0 | 0.2 | -1.9** | -1.2 | -0.5 | |
| situation | (0.8) | (0.9) | (0.7) | (0.8) | (0.9) | (0.8) | (0.9) | (0.8) | (0.8) | (0.7) | |
| Core city | -0.4 | -0.9 | -0.4 | -0.01 | 0.6 | -0.4 | 1.2 | 2.1* | -0.7 | 0.2 | |
| | (0.8) | (1.3) | (0.7) | (1.1) | (0.8) | (1.2) | (0.9) | (1.2) | (0.8) | (0.9) | |
| Population (ln) | -0.03 | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.9 | 0.3 | -0.8 | 0.4 | 0.5 | 0.6 | -0.6 | |
| opulation (m) | (0.4) | (0.9) | (0.3) | (0.7) | (0.4) | (0.8) | (0.4) | (0.8) | (0.4) | (0.6) | |
| German- | 0.1 | -2.5* | 1.0 | 0.4 | -0.8 | 0.4 | -0.5 | 0.5 | 1.1 | 1.6* | |
| speaking | (0.8) | (1.4) | (0.7) | (1.1) | (0.8) | (1.2) | (0.9) | (1.2) | (0.8) | (0.9) | |
| Constant | 14.6*** | 4.7 | 9.2** | -0.6 | 11.2** | 20.2** | 5.2 | 7.7 | | | |
| | (4.4) | (9.2) | (3.7) | (7.5) | (4.7) | (8.2) | (4.8) | (8.1) | | | |
| Observations | 36 | 42 | 36 | 42 | 36 | 42 | 36 | 42 | 37 | 44 | |
| \mathbb{R}^2 | 0.5 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.3 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 0.2 | |
| Adjusted R ² | 0.3 | -0.04 | 0.02 | 0.1 | 0.2 | -0.1 | 0.02 | 0.2 | | | |
| Residual Std. Error | 1.9 (df = 26) | 2.7 (df = 32) | 1.6 (df = 26) | 2.2 (df = 32) | 2.0 (df = 26) | 2.4 (df = 32) | 2.1 (df = 26) | 2.4 (df = 32) | | | |
| F Statistic | 2.5** (df = 9; 26) | 0.8 (df = 9; 32) | 1.1 (df = 9; 26) | 1.3 (df = 9; 32) | 1.8 (df = 9; 26) | 0.7 (df = 9; 32) | 1.1 (df = 9; 26) | 2.5** (df = 9; 32) | | | |
| $chi^2 (df = 9)$ | | | | | | | | | 27.4*** | 11.3 | |

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Appendix II: Items used from the European Mayor Survey (registered for Switzerland in fall 2015)

Remark: Swiss mayors could choose between a German, French and Italian survey form, online or in paper.

1. Many different tasks are associated with the mayor's position. How important do you think the following tasks are?

Please choose the appropriate response for each item:

| | Not a task of the mayor | Of little importance | Of moderate importance | Of great importance | Of utmost importance (limit to 3 answers please) |
|---|-------------------------------|----------------------|------------------------------|---------------------|--|
| To foster the co-operation with the neighbouring municipalities (<u>cooperative</u>) | | | | | |
| To manage the implementation of his/her personal policy choices (<u>authoritarian</u>) | | | | | |
| To encourage new projects in the community (strategic) | | | | | |
| To set goals for transforming the administrative structure (strategic) | | | | | |
| To ensure the correctness of the political-administrative process (reproductive) | | | | | |
| To guide the staff in day to day activities (<u>reproductive</u>) | | | | | |

Remark by the authors: The dimension cooperative-authoritarian was calculated by averaging the value of the item indicating cooperative style and the inverse value of the item indicating an authoritarian style. For dichotomization of this dimension we used the average of the Swiss mayors as a cleavage point. Analogously the reproductive-strategic dimension was calculated as an average of the strategic items and the inverse of the reproductive items. A similar approach was followed by Getimis and Hlepas (2006, 182).

| indicate the degree t | o which it is an impo | at many municipalities a ortant priority on the pol | | | | | _ | - | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|--|---------------|----------------------|--------|-------|---------|------------|--|
| your current term of | | a soons of 5 in diagram the " | IIi ah mui au | .; ₄ , ,, | | | | | |
| | | a score of 5 indicates the " | Hign prior | uy . | | | | | |
| Please choose the app | ropriate response for e | acn item: | | | | | | | |
| | | | | 1 | | | | 5 | |
| | | | | Low | 2 | 3 | 4 | High | |
| | | | | priorit | | | | priorit | |
| 1 m · | | Te. 1 C1 ' 1 | 1 6 | у | | | | у | |
| | | lity as a place of business and a | | | | | | | |
| people to live in, by re | ies, | | ш | ш | ╵╙╵ | | | | |
| | esthetics of the city, etc. | | 1.11 | | | | | | |
| | | using, health care, education, pr | | | | | | | |
| | take care of the needs of | vulnerable groups (the elderly, | the young, | | Ш | Ш | ш | | |
| the unemployed etc.) | | | | | | | | | |
| C To protect the natura | l environment and secure | e the responsible use of natural 1 | esources | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| D To secure public safe | ty, fight crime and secure | law and order | | | Ш | Ш | Ш | | |
| E To address politico-ad | lministrative issues, e.g. i | in order to improve relations wi | th citizens, | | | | | | |
| | | grity and fighting corruption, etc | | | | Ш | Ш | | |
| F To preserve the local | identity and the locality's | traditional lifestyle | | | П | П | П | | |
| 1 To preserve the local | deficitly and the locality s | traditional mestyle | | | | | | | |
| G To stimulate econom | ic growth and employm | ent | | | | | | | |
| II T | -1:-644 | | | | | | | | |
| H 10 improve commun | nal infrastructure, comm | unication and transport | | | Ш | Ш | Ш | Ш | |
| | | or cultural minorities and emp | ohasize | | | | | | |
| diversity and tolerand | e in the local community | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| 9 How many hours d | lo vou spend each we | ek in the following activiti | ec? | | | | | | |
| meetings with council | | ck in the following activiti | | | | 1 | ours | /week | |
| meetings with eathers | | | | | | | 10 0110 | , ,, ,, ,, | |
| meetings with adminis | strative staff | | | hours/week | | | /week | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| meetings with citizen | s, groups, etc (<u>as shar</u> | e of hours spent in total) | | | | ŀ | ours | /week | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | e Town Hall (weddings, reg | gister | | | ŀ | ours | /week | |
| activities, receptions | | | | | | | | | |
| public debates and cor | nferences outside the T | own Hall | | | | ŀ | ours | /week | |
| C'-11 '-' | 1 ((" . ! . 1) ! ! ! ! . | | | | | 1 | | / 1 | |
| field visits (official an | d unofficial) in the city | | | | | ľ | iours | /week | |
| meetings with authorit | ties from other cities | | | | | 1 | Our | /wook | |
| meetings with authorn | iles from other cities | | | hours/week | | | WEEK | | |
| meetings with authorit | ties from the region, na | tional government | | hours/weel | | | /week | | |
| meetings with authoris | | nours/ wee | | | , week | | | | |
| individual preparation | | | | 1 | ours | /week | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| political party meeting | | hours/weel | | | /week | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | situation of your municipa | ality? | | | | | | |
| | ropriate response for e | | | | | | | | |
| Very poor | Poor | Neither good nor poor | Goo | d | | Ver | y goo | d | |
| | | | | | | | | | |

| | 8. On the basis of lease choose the ap | • | - | | • | | do you | agree w | ith the | followir | ng statem | ents? |
|----|--|---------|---|---|---|---|--------|----------|---------|-------------------------------------|-----------|-------------------|
| | | | | | | | Strong | 1 1 1192 | igree | Neither agree nor disagree | Agree | Strongly agree |
| T | he market is the be | housing | | | | | | | | | | |
| di | There is often talk about a left-right dimension in politics. Where would you place yourself on a left-right dimension? Please choose the appropriate response for each item: | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | Left 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | | ight 10 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | [| |