Towards the Just City?

Attitudes of European City Mayors Heading Towards the Just City

Oliver Dlabac*, Roman Zwicky, Juliet Carpenter, Patrícia Pereira

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Abstract

This paper takes up the concept of the 'Just City' (Fainstein 2010) and follows the conceptual orientation within an own ongoing comparative case study for Birmingham, Lyon and Zurich, trying to identify the 'democratic foundations of the Just City' (Carpenter, Dlabac, and Zwicky 2015; Dlabac 2014). Socially just urban planning orientations, it is hypothesised, are favoured by corresponding national welfare state regimes and planning systems, by Europeanization processes and by a strong and cooperative mayoral leadership that favours the participation of the broader public above a more restrictive cooperation with the local business community.

The second round of the European mayor's survey allows assessing the mayor's agenda with regard to social justice: refusal of market solutions for attending housing needs; insistence on public delivery of services; and a strong adherence to integrated urban projects. Whereas welfare state regimes deliver little explanatory power, we find indications for the role of national planning systems and Europeanization processes. Considerable variation, however, remains at the level of the cities after accounting for cross-national variation. Besides a leftist political orientation, community-based urban leaders clearly distinguish themselves from business-oriented leaders.

**Corresponding author:* oliver.dlabac@zda.uzh.ch

1. Introduction

There has long been concern in the social sciences about issues surrounding social justice in the city. Urban geographers such as David Harvey (1973; 1996) are inherently interested in the spatial dimension of urban society, seeking to understand the interactions between society and space in an urban context, and in particular in relation to social justice (Merrifield and Swyngedouw, 1997). This has led to the development of the notion of spatial justice (Soja, 2010), seeking to explore the relationship between space and (in)justices in society, whether it be in relation to spatial segregation (the 'unfreedom argument') or the unequal spatial allocation of resources (the 'unfair resources argument') (Marcuse, 2009a: 3). Spatial (in)justice is defined by Soja as "an intentional and focused emphasis on the spatial or geographical aspects of justice and injustice" with the starting point being "the fair and equitable distribution in space of socially valued resources and the opportunities to use them" (Soja, 2009: 2). This spatial turn in relation to justice is also reflected by a renewed interest in Henri Lefebvre's work (Lefebvre, 1968), in particular his notion of the "Right to the City" (Friedmann, 1995; Harvey 2008) which he defines as a "demand …. [for] a transformed and renewed access to urban life" (Lefebvre, 1996: 158).

The concept of social justice in the city has also been further elaborated recently in debates over "The Just City" (Marcuse et al, 2009), in particular as developed by the urban planner Susan Fainstein (2010). In her book of the same name, Fainstein presents the concept of "The Just City" as both an analytical concept as well as a political tool, aiming to set out a theory of justice that can be used to assess urban planning policies in different contexts. Her underlying narrative is that justice should be a guiding principle of urban planning policy, and should be given precedence in the face of an expanding neo-liberal ideology that in recent years has prioritised urban growth and competitiveness above social justice. In her book, she assesses the concept of the Just City through an evaluation of urban policy decisions using three core criteria related to outcomes (equity, democracy and diversity) applied in three case study cities: Amsterdam, London and New York.

Underlying these three related concepts (social justice, spatial justice and the Just City) is the assumption that justice is a desired goal for society. As John Rawls' writing on justice suggests (1971: 4), there is an "intuitive conviction of the primacy of justice" that underpins the work of scholars of social justice in the city. Similarly, there is an understanding that policies formulated at the city level by planners under the direction of their mayors, should have an underlying rationale to reduce social injustice and social inequalities, in order to address "unjust geographies and spatial structures of privilege" (Soja, 2009: 5).

While Fainstein's 2010 framework offers a useful starting point for analysing the Just City, we argue here that there is one key aspect missing from her analysis, that is, the role that mayors, as the leaders of city institutions, can play in producing equitable outcomes in the planning sphere. We suggest here that enhancing our understanding of how mayors perceive their role in planning processes and the subsequent outcomes could help to project how mayors can influence policy to move closer towards the goal of the Just City in the future. Through access to a recent comprehensive survey of mayors in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants in some 29 European countries (Heinelt et al 2018), a valuable cross-national comparative approach can be taken to explore current mayoral attitudes related to approaches to Just City policies. By exploring their attitudes towards planning and their political priorities, in the context of their particular national

spatial planning structures and welfare systems, as well as local agency factors, a better understanding can be grasped of mayoral positions towards policies that can support the Just City, so furthering our awareness of how barriers towards the Just City can be overcome.

The aim of this paper therefore is to introduce a political science perspective into the debate around the Just City. Instead of analysing the micro-level dynamics of single planning projects, we shift our attention to the role of political leadership in supporting Just City policies, by exploring mayors' perspectives on different policies and political priorities that could support just planning outcomes in the city. More specifically, we propose an international comparative framework for investigating the attitudes of urban political leaders to different aspects of policy-making related to the Just City, taking into account the national planning systems and welfare state regimes within which they are operating. Specifically, we seek to explore:

1. What are the attitudes of mayors towards policies related to the Just City, such as housing, public services and integrated programs for large-scale projects, and how do these differences manifest themselves between countries?
2. Within particular countries, how do mayors respond to individual Just City policy domains, taking into account local contexts?

The following Section 2 develops Fainstein's concept of the Just City, and sets out some of the urban planning domains that are mediated by the broader democratic institutions within the context of the Just City. Section 3 elaborates the comparative framework for analysing political leadership for the Just City, with reference to urban planning policies. In Section 4 we explore the planning orientations of mayors across different welfare state regimes and planning systems in Europe, followed by Section 5, in which we analyse the role of mayoral leadership and local context in attitudes towards policies that support the Just City. Section 6 concludes with a summary of how perceptions of European mayors towards policies related to the Just City are manifest, in relation to welfare state regimes, national planning systems and local contexts, and the implications of these findings for the future of the Just City.

2. The Just City Debate

The starting point for this paper is Fainstein's concept of the "Just City" (Fainstein 2009; 2010), in which the notion of equity takes a central position, that is: "a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (Fainstein 2010: 36). Fainstein argues that to date, in discussions on social justice in the city, there has been over-emphasis by communicative planning theorists on democratic deliberation, whom she sees as focusing too heavily on planning processes and decision-making to achieve just outcomes. She argues that democratic procedures in planning do not necessarily produce equitable outcomes in the city, and there needs to be recognition of the differential outcomes of policy options in relation to urban justice.

Democratic theory has, in Fainstein's view, failed more broadly to demonstrate "adequate representation of all interests in a large, socially divided group, protecting against demagoguery, achieving more than token public participation, preventing economically or institutionally powerful

interests from defining the agenda, and maintaining minority rights" (Fainstein 2010, 29). Social programmes, she concludes, depend on a combination of pressure from below, political-bureaucratic receptiveness at national and local level, and majoritarian support by the broader public and by centre-left coalitions in the case of Europe. Accordingly, social programmes and redevelopment policies are often based on coalitions involving downtown business and conservative segments of the population, resulting in further suburbanization and segregation (Fainstein 2010, 167–168).

In reaction to Fainstein's thesis, some have argued that her criticism of communicative planning is unjustified. Fischer (2009) suggests that the communicative approach urges planners to critically reflect on their own ways of arguing and on hidden forms of communicative power. While most planning practices are indeed limited to the level of technical assessments, deliberation on social justice includes a higher level discourse on broader societal impacts and alternative social systems. Marcuse (2009, 95) takes another position, criticising Fainstein's concept for "accepting the existing structures, laws, and institutions as given", thus neglecting the power structures that lead to injustice in the first place. In an alternative world, citizens might enjoy the right to decent living and decent work, community-based interests and decision-making processes might be formally binding on development, private property rights might be seen as endowed with a social purpose, and city agencies dealing with economic growth might be limited by other municipal agencies dealing with education, incomes, environment and family welfare (Marcuse 2009, 97–98). The legitimacy of existing planning practices therefore needs to be challenged, placing those in power in the defensive position of justifying their approaches.

Here we elaborate on Marcuse's point, by introducing into the discussion on the Just City an analysis of political leadership through mayoral attitudes, explored within the the institutional frameworks that structure urban planning decisions, i.e. the welfare and spatial planning systems, as the democratic foundation of the Just City. We argue that institutional frameworks play an important role in contributing to social justice in the city, an aspect which has hitherto been neglected in the debates on the Just City. In "The Just City" (2010), Fainstein identifies four key urban planning domains through which urban political institutions can contribute to a more just city: urban regeneration including zoning; housing; public space and amenities; and mega projects. Table 1 below elaborates on each of these domains, illustrating the parameters for formal political decision-making, and the criteria that could be used for assessing just urban planning policies. Under urban regeneration, decisions around for example the location of regeneration areas can have a major impact on the spatial concentration of social groups and potential mixed communities. Similarly, decisions related to housing and in particular the provision of social housing impacts on spatial justice through access to affordable housing in certain locations. Providing inclusive public spaces and amenities that are open to all represents a further example of where political decision-making can impact on justice in the city. Mega projects, finally, usually include several of the aforementioned domains, requiring an integrated reflection of multiple concerns of the Just City.

Table 1: Urban planning domains and criteria for just urban planning, after Fainstein (2010)

Urban planning domains	Parameters for formal local political decision making	Criteria for assessing just urban planning policies at the local level
Urban regeneration and land use	Location of areas for regeneration, densification, residential use, mixed-use developments, affordable housing, public acquisition and use of land and properties	• Ghettoization: avoiding spatial concentrations of disadvantaged groups • Gentrification: minimising displacement of disadvantaged groups
Housing	Location and funding of public housing; incentives, grants and land for non-profit / cooperative housing; prescription of means test, rent supplements	• Affordable housing: Creation and preservation of affordable and decent housing that is accessible to economically and socially deprived groups • Avoiding ghettoization and counteracting gentrification (see above)
Public services and facilities	Location and funding of schools, school mixing policies, public transportation, health services, elderly homes, recreation centres, community centres	• Capabilities and recognition: High quality services ensuring opportunities for quality of life, health, bodily integrity, access to education and control over political and material environment for disadvantaged groups
Public spaces	Location, funding, and design of public spaces, green spaces	• Shared spaces: Creation or transformation of public spaces and green spaces that are attractive and accessible to socially disadvantaged groups
Mega projects	Location and purpose of mega projects involving public investments and exactions from private developers (affordable housing, public uses)	• Integrated projects taking into account issues of ghettoization, gentrification, affordable housing, shared spaces, capabilities and recognition (see above)

Source: Authors' extended elaboration based on Fainstein (2010)

In this article, we concentrate on three key areas of planning policy in relation to the Just City, that of housing, public services and mega-projects. As can be seen from Table 1, these are core areas of political decision-making that can have a profound impact on the criteria used to assess the Just City. They relate directly to issues of 'distributional justice' through the provision of resources as well as opportunities to access resources, through policies that work towards just outcomes, to ensure that

all social groups can take advantage of opportunities to use socially valued resources in the urban built environment (Soja, 2009). Through these policies, political decisions are taken that work towards just outcomes for citizens, through contributions to social and spatial justice in the city. The complex processes through which these just outcomes arise are detailed further in the following section, which provides a comparative framework for analysing political leadership for the Just City, and the contexts through which such outcomes are achieved.

3. Comparative Framework: Political Leadership for the Just City

In order to study the role of urban political leaders in promoting or hindering just urban planning policies, we develop a framework that allows for cross-national comparisons, taking into account national systems of welfare and planning, as well as local contextual conditions. We follow an 'actor centred institutionalism approach' (Mayntz and Scharpf 1995) and postulate that the regulatory and institutional context of urban systems through national welfare and planning structures defines a corridor of action for urban leaders: some options are made available, some constraints and incentives are introduced. Within this "feasible set", local political actors are able to manoeuvre. Urban political leaders, conceptualized as political actors with public visibility and accountability (as opposed to other influential local actors), may try to involve community groups into single planning projects in order to bring legitimacy to decisions. This aspect has been amply studied in a European research project exploring possible complementarities of urban leadership and community involvement at the neighbourhood level (Haus, Heinelt, and Stewart 2005; Heinelt, Sweeting, and Getimis 2006). However, political leaders may also take a more narrow route to cooperative planning, limiting themselves to cooperation with the local business community.

Given that our case explicitly focuses on planning politics with a broader view on formal planning policies at the city level (i.e. housing, public services and large-scale integrated projects), it seems particularly relevant to account not only for the local context, but also for differing national planning and welfare systems, i.e. the regulations and policies at different state levels restricting or enabling particular policy options at the municipal level. It could also be argued, in an increasingly influential European Union context, that cities involved with European Union regional funding streams are increasingly shaped by the principles that frame such programmes. This process of ‘Europeanization’ (Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010; Olsen 2002) involves not only the influence of the principles underlying funding streams such as the Cohesion and Structural Funds, but also the social and spatial justice principles underlying the wider European Social Model, one of the cornerstones of the European project (Faludi, 2007; Davoudi, 2005). This supra-national context should also be taken into account when considering political leaders’ perceptions and attitudes towards the Just City.

In order to allow for a European analysis, we take a ‘cross-country’ approach as well as a ‘within-country’ approach, with the assumption that mayoral preferences towards the Just City vary both within and between countries. The following Figure 1 summarizes the key aspects that could impact on mayoral leadership with respect to policy preferences towards the Just City. Each of the key aspects is elaborated on in turn below.

Figure 1: Comparative framework for the study of the political leadership for the Just City



Drawing out the various elements sketched out above, we elaborate below on the underlying principles behind each aspect, to derive a number of working hypotheses which will be tested through empirical analysis. We base the various elements of the framework on existing typologies of 'welfare state regimes' and 'planning systems', while also introducing aspects of the local context and mayoral leadership that might impact on preferences towards the Just City. These aspects will be tested through the hypothesis.

3.1 Welfare state regimes

In The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 1990), Esping-Andersen presents a typology of welfare states based upon the principles of de-commodification, social stratification and the private–public mix. This typology results of an analysis of the arrangements between market, state and family in 18 OECD countries and puts forward 3 categories: 1) the social democratic, 2) the conservative-corporatist and 3) the liberal. Being a seminal work, validated by further research (Saint-Arnaud & Bernard, 2003), Esping-Andersen's proposal was not spared to scientific criticism: due to its lack of attention to gender issues (Lewis, 1997), but also for leaving aside countries in southern Europe (Ferrera, 1996) and not accounting for the peculiarities of eastern European post-communist states (Fenger, 2007). Fenger states that, "although there is a wide variety of different labels under which welfare states might be classified - each based upon different indicators - it is surprising to observe how persistent the clustering of countries is" (2007, p. 7). The author points out that the 3 types presented by Esping-Andersen tend to persist in different typologies, even when new categories are added.

In table 2, we follow Fenger (2007) and present a typology of European welfare states that includes Esping-Andersen's and adds the 4) rudimentary/Latin and 5) post-communist types. In 1) social-democratic welfare states, the level of de-commodification and the taxes are high, as is the level of public expenditure. The benefits are universal, highly redistributive and do not depend on individual contributions. Correspondingly, well-being levels are also high. It is interesting to note that the countries within this type of welfare system, mostly Nordic, tend to also have high levels of female participation in the labour market. The 2) corporatist-conservative states, Austria, Germany and

France, are characterized by moderate levels of both de-commodification and government expenditures. The state tends to restrict its direct action to income maintenance benefits related to one's occupational status and the principle of subsidiarity applies, meaning that the state interferes solely when the family can no longer provide. Female participation in the labour market is marked by the discouragement of married women. The 3) liberal welfare state type, found in Anglo-Saxon countries, is in its turn characterized by a low level of government expenditures, means-tested assistance and little redistribution of income, thus by high levels of inequality. The existing benefits cater mainly to a clientele of low-income, usually working-class, state dependents. The 4) rudimentary or Latin/southern European type is mostly characterized, as the label suggests, by the lack of an articulated social minimum and by diverse income maintenance schemes. In these countries, Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece, reliance on the family and voluntary sector is also a prominent feature (Bambra, 2007). 5) Post-communist welfare states "cannot be reduced to any of Esping-Andersen's or any other well-known types of welfare states", but a specific type of post-communist welfare states does not emerge from the empirical data analysed by Fenger (2007, p. 27). The author states that they can be characterised by the lower levels of their governmental programmes and the social situation.

Table 2: Welfare state regimes and national planning systems

Welfare state regimes	Characteristics
Social-democratic	• High level of government expenditures • High level of decommodification • High taxes • High income redistribution • High female participation on labour market • High level of well-being
Corporatist	• Moderate level of government expenditures • Moderate level of decommodification • Provision of income maintenance • Low female participation on labour market • Principle of subsidiarity
Liberal	• Low level of government expenditures • Means-tested assistance • High level of inequality • Low level of spending on social protection
Rudimentary	• Lack of an articulated social minimum
Post-communist	• Moderate level of government expenditures

Sources: Fenger (2007): Welfare regimes in Central and Eastern Europe: Incorporating post-communist countries in a welfare regime typology. Contemporary Issues and Ideas in Social Sciences.
Simeoneva (2015): A comparative study of different Balkan spatial planning systems: the cases of Bulgaria, Croatia, Serbia, Albania.

Housing policies are conceived and implemented within the wider framework of public policies and particular types of welfare state systems, combining the efforts of market, state and households in the provision of housing (Matznetter, 2002). Barlow and Duncan (1994) were among the first to relate the typologies of housing production and land supply to Esping-Andersen's typology and concluded that: liberal welfare regimes tend to have large builders/developers who rely more on speculative

development gains than on building profits; in the social democratic regimes, because land supply is under public control, for profit builders must rely on building profits only; the corporatist type has a more fragmented building industry, but more speculative gains than the social-democratic regimes; finally, the rudimentary welfare states have the smaller builders and the highest speculative gains in the land development process. Other analyses have followed, including for example Kemeny's (Kemeny, 2001) - that proposes a twofold classification of rental housing systems, an Anglo-Saxon 'dualist system' and a Germanic 'unitary market', respectively linked with the liberal welfare state and the corporatist welfare state; and Balchin's (1996) - that offers an analysis based on housing tenure. For Matznetter (2002), these attempts of linking housing and welfare regimes were still crude, and the literature would be much enriched by national case-studies, such as the one he proposes for Austria.

Other authors have dedicated themselves to assess the importance of housing within the welfare state. According to Malpass (2008), the scholarly literature that has been characterizing housing either as the 'wobbly pillar' or the increasingly important cornerstone of the welfare state is more interesting to explain the past than the present of the relationship between them. He then suggests that "the capacity of housing to become a cornerstone of the welfare state is due to its capital intensive nature, which was precisely the reason given by Torgersen for arguing that housing was the wobbly pillar" (Malpass, 2008, p. 1) and that scholars must embrace both the role of housing within the welfare state and the potential for the housing market to influence and support the distribution and consumption of welfare services. Kemeny also points out the pressing need of working on the relationship of housing to other areas of welfare, such as transport, planning, labour policy and child care (2001, p. 68).

For Dewilde and Decker (2016), housing policy is unique because, while other social services are mainly redistributed by the state, for housing, the market is the main mechanism of distribution, States only provide correctives. Conceiving "right to housing" as access to both decent and affordable housing, they define de-commodification as housing for all realized as a social right. Thus, they hypothesize that better access to decent and affordable housing mainly results from higher levels of welfare state policies. Besides finding support in empirical data for this hypothesis, Dewilde and Decker stress the importance of other processes and policies in the pursuit of the right to housing, such as "increasing income inequality, economic growth (before the crisis) and decline (after the crisis) impacting on wages and (un)employment, and processes of welfare state restructuring and retrenchment, in particular the implementation of austerity measures during the post-crisis years" (2016, p. 147). The impacts of the global financial crisis of 2007 have been unequally distributed across Europe and the social spectrum, more concentrated in the south and on low-income populations (Andreotti & Mingione, 2016).

Departing from the discussion of welfare state regimes and their relation to housing and service provision, and accounting for the perturbances following the financial crisis, we propose the following hypothesis:

H1a: Just City preferences are more prominent in countries with social-democratic and corporatist welfare state tradition, and less prominent in countries with liberal welfare state traditions. Mayoral ambitions and problem perceptions are less straightforward in rudimentary and post-communist welfare states, particularly in those countries most severely hit by the financial crisis of 2007.

3.2 National planning systems

There have been various attempts to draw up a typology of the different national spatial planning systems in the EU. The most commonly cited typology comes from the EU Compendium of Spatial Planning Systems and Policies which outlines four traditions in spatial planning that broadly characterize the different approaches that can be found in Europe (CEC, 1997; also see Nadin & Stead, 2008), see Table 3. The 'regional economic planning' tradition is characterized by the broad term 'spatial planning', in that it combines economic and social aims with objectives of territorial cohesion. Central government is one of the main actors in addressing regional disparities and development pressures through public sector investment (CEC, 1997: 36). The second tradition, the 'comprehensive integrated approach "[…] is conducted through a very systematic and formal hierarchy of plans from national to local level, which coordinate public sector activity across different sectors but focus more specifically on spatial co-ordination than economic development" (CEC, 1997: 36-37). In this case, planning institutions and mechanisms need to be responsive with a political commitment to the planning process.

The third approach is the tradition of 'land use management', with a focus on land use management and control. Local authorities are the main actors in this tradition, although central governments set guidelines and oversee municipal action. The fourth approach is 'urbanism', based on regulation, rigid codes and strongly inspired by architectural and urban design considerations (CEC, 1997: 37).

Table 3: National Planning Systems in Europe

National planning systems	Characteristics
'Regional economic planning' tradition	• Central government as main actor for counteracting regional disparities and public sector investments • Broad meaning of term spatial planning: social and economic aims
'Comprehensive integrated' approach	• Spatial planning through systematic and formal hierarchy of plans • Cross-sectoral coordination with focus on spatial co-ordination rather than economic development
'Land use management' approach	• Control of land use by local authorities, central state regulation • Narrow objective of sustainable development and growth
'Urbanism' tradition	• Rigid zoning codes and building regulations • Limited to architectural and urban design considerations

Nadin & Stead (2007): European Spatial Planning Systems, Social Models and Learning. disP - The Planning Review, 44:172, 35-47,
Farinós Dasi (ed.) (2007): Governance of Territorial and Urban Policies from EU to Local Level. Final Report of ESPON Project 2.3.2. Esch-sur-Alzette: ESPON Coordination Unit.
European Commission (1997): The EU compendium of spatial planning systems and policies. Brussels.

This typology was developed over 20 years ago, and a number of scholars have called into question its continued relevance, given the hybridity of models that has evolved in the intervening years. Complexity has been introduced, as the original countries learn from each other through processes of policy mobility, and as new member states have joined the EU introducing additional dimensions from their post-Communist frameworks (Tosics et al, 2010, ESPON 2005). Although the complexity and divergence of Europe's spatial planning systems is clear (Reimer et al 2013), the four-point typology nevertheless provides a useful starting point for classifying Europe's different spatial planning systems.

Based on this four point typology, it can be suggested that the regional economic approach arguably offers urban leaders the widest array of options for pursuing just urban planning policies, particularly if national grants for housing, public spaces and amenities, and mega projects with public involvement are available in relation to outcomes for social justice. The comprehensive integrated approach also favours the choice of Just City policy options for urban leaders, although in comparison to the 'regional economic' tradition, this approach makes just urban planning more dependent on the successful spatial coordination of public intervention across sectors and levels of government. In contrast, national planning systems based on the tradition of land use management or urbanism would seem the least favourable environments for urban leaders to engage in just urban planning policies. We can therefore suggest the following hypothsis:

H1b: Mayoral preference for Just City policies such as large-scale integrated projects is more prominent in countries with a 'regional economic planning' tradition or a 'comprehensive integrated' approach, compared to countries with a 'land use management' or 'urbanism' planning tradition.

3.3 Europeanization

The process of Europeanization is a concept that has been extensively discussed in the academic policy literature, although not always with a common understanding among scholars about its definition (Olsen, 2002). Here we understand Europeanization as the process by which the EU, through its policies and governance processes, has an impact on member states' own domestic policies and practices. This definition can be extended to include both 'down-load' and 'up-load' Europeanization, that is, the influence that the EU has on domestic approaches to policy and governance practicies (down-load), or vice versa, how individual member states have impacted on the EU's policy agenda, through the adoption of domestic policy approaches at the EU level (up-load). Horizontal, or circular, Europeanization can also take place, where policy mobility occurs between member states, or cities, without necessarily using the EU as a conduit. For example, this is the case when practice is transferred between cities, through networks such as Eurocities and URBACT (Kern, 2007).

It could be argued that in the field of urban policy, the EU's approach to addressing urban challenges within the framework of the European Social Model, has led to a number of practices and approaches being adopted in domestic practice, through the process of Europeanization (Carpenter, 2013). Many of these approaches promoted through the EU's Structural Funds, particularly the 'integrated sustainable urban development' approach in the current programming period[1], align strongly with policies related to the Just City. These include taking an integrated approach to tackling urban challenges, working in partnership with different urban stakeholders through the partnership principle, and engaging with local communities in a process of collaborative planning (Gonzalez Medina and Fedeli, 2015).In the light of the specific practicies promoted through the Structural Funds, in relation to urban development and the links with cities' policies to support the Just City, we can propose the following hypothesis:

[1] Indeed, national programs of the European Cohesion Funds for the period 2014-2020 often emphasize the role of cross-sectoral integration in large infrastructure projects, see: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes?search=1&keywords=integrated&periodId=3&countryCode=ALL&regionId=ALL&objectiveId=16&tObjectiveId=ALL

H1c: Mayors in countries that have been recipients of EU Structural Funds have a preference for integrated large-scale projects and other policies that support the Just City, particularly mayors in EU cohesion countries and in third countries entitled to Pre-Accession Assistance.

3.4 Mayoral Leadership

Whereas the previous sections were concerned with the national regulatory context for explaining cross-national variations, it is plausible that mayoral leadership for the Just City will vary according to the local context and personal traits of a particular mayor in question. Besides the obvious role of the mayoral ideology along a left-right political scale, with leftist mayors supposedly holding stronger support for extensive welfare policies, mayors may also have very different understandings on the role that local business groups and community representatives may have for their urban planning efforts. If we follow urban regime theory (Stone 1993), we would expect a mayor engaging in Just City policies to try to mobilize community groups and the broad masses in order to legitimize large scale urban projects that help 'expand the opportunities of lower classes'. More economically oriented mayors, however, would rather limit themselves to cooperative relations with the local business community in order to develop and expand their city, even if at the cost of vulnerable population groups. More generally, however, mayors behave as simple care takers following a 'maintenance agenda', simply carrying out the routine functions of city government.

Table 3 is partly based on Getimis and Grigoriadou (2005), who create a fourfold typology of leadership styles by combining two different dimensions – the mayoral exercise of power (authoritarian vs. cooperative) and the mayoral predisposition for strategic change. For our purposes, we instead propose to investigate the first dimension more closely by distinguishing various ideal types of power sharing. This is because, particularly with regard to planning policies aiming at more social justice, it should make a difference, whether mayor's cooperative behaviour is directed towards business representatives or further expanded towards societal actors (Stone 1993).

Table 3: Cooperation styles for mayoral leadership

Exercise of power	**Ideal types**	**Characteristics**
Cooperative ('power to')	Community-based	• Multilateral agenda setting, based on bargaining and deliberation, involving wide range of societal actors
	Business-oriented	• Multilateral agenda setting, based exclusively on bargaining and deliberation with business representatives
Authoritarian ('power over')	City boss / care taker	• Hierarchic command and control, unilateral agenda setting, relying on positional competence as mayor

Source: Own elaboration after Stone (1993) and Getimis and Grigoriadou (2005)

We propose the following hypotheses:

H2a: Community-based urban political leaders will favour Just City policies, whereas business-oriented leaders will tend to deny the need for such policies.

H2b: Leftist mayors will favour Just City policies clearly more than rightist mayors

H2c: EU-oriented mayors will rather follow an 'Europeanised' urban development strategy, favouring integrated large-scale projects coupled with Just City policies.

Since the local context will additionally affect mayoral attitudes and policy preferences, we further account mayor's perception of the municipal financial situation, for the city type (core cities, agglomeration, more isolated cities), and the size of the city.

4. Planning Orientations across Welfare States Regimes and Planning Systems in Europe

As previously stated, theoretical and empirically based literature points to close knitted links between welfare state regimes and the provision of housing and other public services (see 3.1.). However, the survey data regarding mayors' attitudes towards housing does not strongly support our Hypothesis 1a, since the averages for perceived need for housing do not show large variations according to welfare state type.

In contrast to our expectations, mayors in social-democratic countries do not seem to be particularly skeptical towards the market when it comes to addressing housing needs. mayors in Norway today even seem to be significantly more inclined towards market solutions than in many corporatist and even some rudimentary and some post-communist welfare states.

Nordic countries' welfare states are categorised together as social-democratic, however, literature tells us not only that they are in constant negotiation and adjustment in regard to changing political, economic and social forces (Pedersen & Kuhnle, 2017), but also that housing policies and housing markets vary much across these countries (Andersen, Andersson, Wessel, & Vilkama, 2016). Compared with the other social-democratic states, Norway and Denmark have stronger social separation between renting and owning, and thus more dual systems. But also, like Sweden, Norway has large cooperative sectors, that contribute to mitigate the duality and may account for the lower preoccupation of mayors towards providing housing (Andersen et al., 2016).

Similarly, a corporatist tradition is not necessarily linked to a more interventionist stance, as can be seen with the average values in Germany and Belgium. Rather, we should highlight more interventionist predispositions in corporatist France and Italy.

The most market-sceptical and interventionist views, however can be found in Spain, indicating particular pressures and ambitions in a country with a rudimentary welfare state that has additionally been shaken hardly by the global financial crisis of 2007. The housing problem became critical in Spain, but the housing issue also became very present in the public and local political spheres, with the emergence of strong right to housing social movements, like the Platform of Mortgage Victims (PAH) movement (Weerdt & Garcia, 2016), and the success of political actors coming from the ranks of these movements like Ada Colau in Barcelona.

Figure 2: Perceived need for housing intervention by country and welfare state regime



Notes: Graphs depicting national averages and 95% confidence intervals. Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia not reported due to low response rates with less than 20 observations. Iceland with four observations is included since the high response rate ensures a reasonable representation of the national population of cities with more than 10'000 inhabitants.

With regard to the form of service delivery (Figure 3), in turn, mayors in social-democratic countries correspond to our expectations, by supporting either public private partnerships or purely public service delivery. Again, we find mayors in corporatist France and Italy to be more supportive of a purely public delivery of services, but they are even surpassed by their colleagues in financially troubled Spain and Greece. This was not the case in Portugal, however, possibly indicating a stronger mayoral acceptance of the wide-ranging reforms induced by the Troika. Literature shows that the austerity policies implemented, that had deep impacts in the capacity of the Portuguese welfare state, were justified by a narrative around Portugal's incapacity to restore its public and administrative institutions and its economy (Seixas, Tulumello, Corvelo, & Drago, 2015).

Surprisingly, mayors in liberal countries are way less supportive of private service delivery, than expected. Private service provision is actually only supported in the Czech Republic, Albania and Poland from the post-communist country group. As can be seen in the plot, however, there is large variation of current attitudes within this residual group of welfare states. Mayors in Hungary and Lithuania seem to be about just as supportive of service provision by the public authorities as their colleagues in Spain and Greece.

Figure 3: Support for public service delivery by country and welfare state regime



Note: See notes for Figure 2.

In line with our expected hypothesis H1b, mayors in countries with regional economic planning system do indeed emphasize the need to develop integrated programs for important urban projects, citing this approach as their second or third priority among eleven possible planning strategies (Figure 4). This fits with the regional economic planning perspective that emphasizes both social and economic objectives in an integrated approach (Magnier et al, 2018 forthcoming). However, this is clearly less often the case in most of the countries with a so-called "comprehensive integrated planning system", which is also included in the hypothesis. This approach aims to provide integration across sectors and/or governance levels, yet it seems that integrated programs for larger urban projects are not a common tool in these countries. As Reimer et al (2013) emphasize however, countries do not necessarily fit neatly into one category, and can display elements of hybridity in the characteristics of their planning systems, with evolution over time in their objectives, and planning modes and tools. Indeed, Germany, that has – before unification – been separated into a Western 'comprehensive integrated' and an Eastern 'regional economic' approach, seems to deviate from the other 'comprehensive integrated' planning systems, displaying a stronger support for integrated programs. The attested hybridization of the German planning system towards the 'regional economic' group (ESPON, 2005) is also evidenced by the long-standing area-based integrated programme, Soziale Stadt (Social City) that was introduced in the late 1990s (BMVBS, 2008).

In respect of our hypothesis H1c, it would appear that European approaches to urban policy have had an influence on mayoral preferences for integrated programmes, where the dominant planning system would not suggest this to be the case. For example, the dominance of the integrated programme as a planning instrument in the Czech Republic, Albania and Greece seems to point to

the role of Europeanisation of urban planning in some countries entitled to EU Cohesion Funds and Pre-Accession Funds. Despite their more narrow planning traditions of land use management and urbanism, data from mayors in these countries suggest that integrated programmes are given priority within a city's urban development strategies. The EU puts particular emphasis on an integrated approach to sustainable urban development and in these countries (Czech Republic, Albania and Greece), processes of download Europeanization could have played a role in disseminating the importance of taking an integrated approach in urban projects (Carpenter J, 2013). In the 1990s, France, England and the Netherlands were particularly influential in shaping the EU's approach to urban policy, although the low scores in Figure 4 for England illustrate more recent policy developments, as there is very little public funding now available for urban projects, and thus mayors were unlikely to cite integrated programmes as a priority, given the current policy climate.

Figure 4: Importance of integrated programs by country and national planning systems



Note: See notes for Figure 2.

So far, we have looked at single attitudes of mayors regarding separate planning domains. In order to find out how mayors actually combine these central variables into sets of attitudes towards Just City policies, we have performed a cluster analysis (variables standardised to 0-10). The three cluster solution[2] can be characterized by the average values on each variable in Figure 5:

[2] The 3-cluster-solution seems to be best with a Duda/Hart-Index of 0.75. The 2-cluster-solution has a lower Duda/Hart-Index of only 0.62. Mayors in Denmark and Netherlands are not included in the cluster analysis, due to incomplete national questionnaires on the items used.

Figure 5: Mean value by cluster (standardized)



Note: The three variables used for cluster analyses have previously been standardised to a scale from 0 to 10.

Mayors assigned to cluster 1 can thus be interpreted as 'limited-sectoral', since they do not generally question the need of publicly delivered services, but being ambivalent regarding the need of housing interventions and least likely to engage in integrated large-scale projects. Mayors of cluster 2, although similarly disinclined to engage in integrated large urban projects, can be labelled 'sectoral-interventionists', since they fully embrace the need for public housing intervention and since they most forcefully insist on public service delivery. Mayors of cluster 3, finally, are clearly supportive of integrated programmes, taking an intermediate stance towards public housing interventions and public service delivery.

In Table four we list the countries sorted according to their shares of mayors pertaining to the limited-sectoral cluster, giving an overview also on the shares for the other two clusters and on the single countries' regulatory contexts. The table allows us to make a more encompassing assessment of our hypotheses 1a-c, so fare discussed only separately for each of the Just City planning policies.

Table 4: Share of mayors assigned to various clusters by country

Country	Cluster 1: Limited-sectoral	Cluster 2: Sectoral-interventionist	Cluster 3: Integrated	Total	Welfare State	Planning System	EU-status
	%	%	%	N			
Norway	84.2	5.3	10.5	19	social democratic	comprehensive integrated	Third country
Iceland	75.0	0.0	25.0	4	social democratic	comprehensive integrated	Third country
Switzerland	68.9	15.6	15.6	90	liberal	comprehensive integrated	Third country
Slovenia	65.2	26.1	8.7	23	post-communist	comprehensive integrated	EU Cohesion country
England	63.3	16.7	20.0	30	liberal	land use	EU
Serbia	61.2	16.3	22.4	49	post-communist	comprehensive integrated	Pre-Accession country
Sweden	59.8	32.8	7.4	122	social democratic	comprehensive integrated	EU
Belgium	58.7	12.8	28.4	109	corporatist	land use	EU
Lithuania	57.1	14.3	28.6	28	post-communist	regional economic	EU Cohesion country
Austria	56.7	10.0	33.3	30	corporatist	comprehensive integrated	EU
Poland	55.2	8.0	36.8	125	post-communist	comprehensive integrated	EU Cohesion country
Croatia	55.2	13.8	31.0	29	post-communist	comprehensive integrated	EU Cohesion country
Portugal	52.1	19.2	28.8	73	rudimentary	regional economic	EU Cohesion country
Italy	45.3	40.3	14.4	201	corporatist	urbanism	EU
Germany	42.9	16.1	41.0	529	corporatist	comprehensive integrated	EU
Albania	34.5	3.4	62.1	29	post-communist	urbanism	Pre-Accession country
Czech Republic	32.7	4.1	63.3	49	post-communist	land use	EU Cohesion country
Greece	29.2	12.5	58.3	96	rudimentary	urbanism	EU Cohesion country
Hungary	27.9	27.9	44.3	61	post-communist	regional economic	EU Cohesion country
Spain	26.1	48.2	25.7	245	rudimentary	urbanism	EU
France	15.5	27.6	56.9	58	corporatist	regional economic	EU
Total	44.6	22.7	32.8	2058			

Remarks: Countries sorted by share of mayors assigned to the 'limited-sectoral' cluster. Shares for Cyprus, Ireland, Latvia, Romania and Slovakia not reported (low response rates with less than 20 observations). Iceland with four observations is included since the high response rate ensures a reasonable representation of the national population of cities with more than 10'000 inhabitants. Netherlands and Denmark missing (incomplete national questionnaires).

At the top of Table 4 we find the non-EU countries Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, with more than two thirds of mayors belonging to the 'limited-sectoral' cluster. Even though, at the aggregate level, the social democratic welfare regimes of Iceland and Norway displayed high values with regard to public service delivery, the share of mayors combining such an attitude with housing interventionism is negligible in these countries (in contrast to EU-member Sweden). Predictably, we find the liberal welfare states of England and Switzerland at the top of the list given their high share of 'limited-sectoral' mayors. In contrast, countries entitled for Cohesion and Pre-Accession Funds and countries with regional economic planning approach tend to have higher shares of mayors of the integrated cluster (France, Hungary, Greece, Czech Republic, Albania – but not Slovenia). Lastly, EU-member countries without such entitlement and planning system show higher shares of mayors with a sectoral-interventionist strategy (Spain, Italy, Sweden). As significant beneficiaries of EU Structural and Cohesion Funds in previous funding periods, Spain and Italy have been influenced by the EU in developing their own domestic urban policies along EU lines (Gonzalez et al 2017). This could have influenced the degree to which mayors in these countries support policies related to the Just City in housing and public services, that are in line with the European Social Model.

From this general pattern, Germany and Austria stand out with substantial shares of mayors engaged in integrated projects. Hamedinger et al (2008) illustrate how the process of Europeanization has impacted on cities in each of these countries, Dortmund (Germany) and Graz (Austria), showing that the integrated approach is key in both cities (although pre-existing in the case of Dortmund due to the legacy of the Soziale Stadt programme).

To conclude this section, we realize that national patterns of mayoral attitudes towards Just City policies are less contingent on welfare state traditions (H1a) than on national planning systems and processes of Europeanisation (H1b-c).

5. The Role of Mayoral Leadership and Local Context

Let us now take a closer look at individual mayors and variation of attitudes *within* the set of European countries covered in the survey. We thus ignore the differences *between* countries discussed above by inserting fixed country coefficients into the following set of regression analyses.

When looking at single variables (Table 5), interventionist views of mayors towards housing and service delivery clearly decrease the more a mayor positions himself or herself towards the right political spectrum (models 1 and 2). The perceived need for housing intervention coincides with mayors ascribing an important role to consultation by and participation of residents with regard to policymaking and public decision-making, whereas business-oriented mayors are more open to public-private or private service delivery. When holding left-right self-positioning and business-orientation constant, mayors in core cities are significantly less insistent on a public delivery of services, as compared to city mayors in the agglomeration or more rural areas. With regard to a mayoral priority for integrated large-scale urban projects (model 3), left-right self-positioning is not a relevant factor. Instead, individual orientation towards the EU and supranational organisations significantly affect whether integrated programs have been chosen as the most important urban development strategy. This finding gives further support to the role of Europeanisation for urban planning, yet this time accounting for mayoral variations within countries, rather than general

patterns in the previous cross-national comparison. Moreover, larger cities seem to give significantly more importance to integrated programs, compared to smaller cities.

Table 5: Regression models on single domains of Just City policies

	(1) Need for housing intervention	(2) Public service delivery	(3) Integrated programs (dummy)
Openness to community involvement	**0.0271*****	-0.00308	0.0419
	(3.30)	(-0.79)	(1.70)
Dependency and cooperation with local business community	-0.0635	**-0.0928***	-0.526
	(-0.77)	(-2.34)	(-1.85)
Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations			**0.146***
			(2.57)
Left-right self-positioning (0-10)	**-0.127*****	**-0.0562*****	0.0153
	(-12.31)	(-11.37)	(0.49)
Mayoral perception of municipal financial situation	-0.0315	-0.0114	-0.00449
	(-1.51)	(-1.17)	(-0.08)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	0.103	**-0.0924****	-0.104
	(1.37)	(-2.58)	(-0.49)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	0.0270	-0.00944	-0.155
	(0.56)	(-0.41)	(-1.08)
Municipal population size (log.)	-0.0218	0.0128	0.190
	(-0.63)	(0.78)	(1.94)
Constant	3.575***	2.521***	
	(9.64)	(14.39)	
R^2	0.119	0.094	
Pseudo-R^2			0.011
N	1924	1927	1889

t statistics in parentheses. OLS regressions for models 1 and 2, binomial logistic regression for model 3. All models with country fixed effects (not reported).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

In Table 6 we try to explain the set of attitudes of individual mayors as captured by the three clusters described in the previous section. We see that a mayor's openness to community involvement, previously explaining a more interventionist approach to housing policies, gives a better explanation for the integrated overall pattern than for the mind set dealing with housing and public services in a strongly sectorized way (models 2 and 3). For the cluster characterized by integrated programs and intermediate levels of interventionism in housing and public services, we note the remaining impact of the mayoral orientation towards the EU, thus giving further evidence to the role of Europeanisation of urban planning.

Moreover, city size previously explaining the importance of integrated programs remains pertinent to such an integrated overall approach. Since the integrated overall approach puts less emphasis on housing intervention and public service delivery, balancing these aims with more business-oriented considerations, political ideology seems to have no significant impact (model 3). Instead, mayors with a more leftist political orientation are more likely to pursue a sectoral-interventionist approach

(model 2), and significantly less likely to take a limited-sectoral approach towards Just City policies (model 1). Interestingly, whereas mayoral openness to community involvement and large city size are significant predictors for an integrated overall approach, the rejection of such openness and a small city size seem to advance a limited-sectoral strategy when measured against the ideal of the Just City (model 1).

Table 6: Binomial logistic regressions explaining probability of a mayor to adhere to the single clusters

	(1) Cluster_1: Limited-sectoral	(2) Cluster_2: Sectoral-interventionist	(3) Cluster_3: Integrated
Openness to community involvement	**-0.0552****	0.00820	**0.0440***
	(-2.69)	(0.34)	(2.01)
Dependency and cooperation with local business community	0.300	0.00384	-0.363
	(1.47)	(0.02)	(-1.57)
Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations			**0.165****
			(3.29)
Left-right self-positioning (0-10)	**0.188*****	**-0.295*****	0.0300
	(7.10)	(-9.16)	(1.08)
Mayoral perception of municipal financial situation	0.0748	0.0152	-0.0672
	(1.46)	(0.25)	(-1.27)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	-0.126	0.140	0.0114
	(-0.67)	(0.66)	(0.06)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	-0.138	**0.314***	-0.0521
	(-1.18)	(2.20)	(-0.42)
Municipal population size (log.)	**-0.246****	0.107	**0.191***
	(-2.85)	(1.08)	(2.17)
Pseudo-R^2	0.040	0.060	0.015
N	1804	1799	1789

t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Taken together, our models show some indications that political leaders with a community-based cooperation style tend to be more inclined for a Just City policy agenda, whereas business-oriented leaders tend to be more willing to sacrifice public service delivery by opting for public-private or private solutions (H2a). In contrast to our hypothesis 2b, however, leftist political orientation does only favour a decisively sectoral-interventionist strategy, whereas an overall integrated strategy does not seem to require a leftist ideology. Lastly, Europeanisation of urban planning is not only relevant for explaining cross-national variation, but it's effect is also affirmed for explaining single mayor's choice of approach towards the Just City.

6. Conclusion

In this paper we have set out to investigate the role of political leadership and the national regulatory context for approaching the Just City ideal. Of course, the predispositions of mayors do not guarantee that the respective policies are actually enacted in that particular city, but nonetheless, mayoral attitudes are a good measure for the general political mood of a city, and it will be an important precondition for planners to succeed in putting forward Just City strategies in the important fields of social housing, public services and integrated urban projects.

As shown in the empirical parts of the paper, mayoral attitudes are indeed partially shaped by national planning systems and processes of Europeanization, although these influences interact in complex ways. Just as importantly, however, we showed that mayors are not captives of their national and supranational structures, but their ideology and cooperation strategies allow for deviations from the respective national mainstream. Mayors oriented towards communities and willing to grasp the opportunities offered by the European Structural Funds do have it in their hands, to actually putting their ideas of the Just City into practice.

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Appendix

Table 7: Operationalization, question wording and measurement (POLLEADER II)

Concept	Question wording	Original scale and transformations
Attitudes regarding urban planning	"On the basis of your experience as a mayor, how much do you agree with the following statements?"	1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
- Need for housing intervention	- The market is the best way to attend housing needs	Inverse scale for *disagreement* with statement: 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree)
Preferred form of service delivery	"Please indicate which form of service delivery is most preferable to the following tasks:"	1=private sector, 2=public private partnership, 3=public sector
- Public service delivery (index)	- Public transport - Maintenance of school buildings - Hospitals - Care homes for the elderly	Index: average value of four items with theoretical minimum of 1=private sector and maximum of 3=public sector
Importance of planning strategies	"To realise his/her ambitions to enhance or preserve the qualities of the local territory (through construction, new infrastructures, natural resources and environment preservation), a mayor may adopt different tactical orientations. Among the following options [A to K], which strategies are in your opinion, those most likely to succeed?"	3=most important, 2=second priority, 1=third priority, 0=not listed among most important three
- Integrated programs	- Develop integrated programs for important urban projects [K] Other priorities to chose from: establish good construction and planning guidelines [A], anticipate and dominate the real estate market [B], impose negotiated criteria in the development operations [C], ensure the cooperation of creative architects [D], involve local society in defining territorial priorities [E], obtain technical support from upper levels of government or public consulting organizations [F], anticipate the environmental and social impacts of projects [G], co-operate with neighboring municipalities on agreed priorities [H], have good contacts with big enterprises and investors [I], have good information on best practices and innovations of other local governments [J]	0 (no priority) to 3 (first priority). For regression analyses we use a dummy for most important strategy

Notions of democracy	«How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?"	1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree)
- Openness to community involvement (index)	- Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies - *Disagreement* with: Political representatives should make what they think are the right decisions, independent of the current views of local people (inverted scale) - Residents should participate actively and directly in making important local decisions - Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives	Index: sum of four items with theoretical minimum of 1=very closed and maximum of 5=very open
Dependency and cooperation with various actors	"If you consider this most important challenge: to what extent would you say that your administration depends on the cooperation and support of the different actors below in addressing this problem. Dependent upon cooperation or support of …"	1 (no dependency) to 5 (highly dependent)
- Dependency and cooperation with local business community	- The local business community	For regression analyses we use a dummy indicating a dependency on business community of 3 or more, while expressing lower values on each of the the three following items: 'neighbourhood organizations', 'voluntary organizations', 'individual citizens'.
- Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations	- The EU and other supranational organizations	
Left-right self-positioning	"There is often talk about a left-right dimension in politics. Where would you place yourself on a left-right dimension?"	0 (left) to 10 (right)
Mayoral perception of municipal financial situation	"How would describe the financial situation of your municipality?"	1 (very poor) to 5 (very good)

Table 8: Mean values for several independent variables

Country	Number of observations (N)	Left (0)-right (10) self-positioning	Openness to community involvement	Dependency and cooperation with business community	Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations	Financial Situation, very poor (1) to very good (5)	Population
Albania		4.93	…			2.55	66339
Belgium		5.91				3.51	27050
Croatia		4.75				3.31	29032
Cyprus		6.40				3.43	32317
Czech Republic		6.09				3.98	28919
Germany		5.20				2.89	31002
Greece		4.29				3.27	60289
Hungary		6.98				3.21	32548
Iceland		5.00				3.20	39453
Ireland		5.00				3.82	.
Israel		4.92				3.46	56800
Italy		3.50				3.15	31170
Latvia		6.17				3.29	22193
Lithuania		5.62				3.47	46299
Norway		6.23				3.36	21598
Poland		6.33				3.61	36416
Portugal		4.46				3.50	85851
Serbia		4.78				2.96	42123
Slovakia		5.71				3.28	54066
Slovenia		4.32				3.63	34104
Spain		3.39				3.26	44601
Sweden		4.86				3.72	37324
Switzerland		5.44				3.51	29760
England		5.41				3.26	228177
France		5.10				3.43	31346
Austria		4.61				3.59	23711
Denmark		5.67				3.39	46457
Netherlands		5.26				.	.
Romania		6.38				3.13	54523
Total (average)		**4.96**				**3.27**	**40670**

Table 9: Regression models on single domains of Just City policies (including EU-orientation as control for all models)

	(1) Need for housing intervention	(2) Public service delivery	(3) Integrated programs (dummy)
Openness to community involvement	**0.0281*****	-0.00358	0.0419
	(3.43)	(-0.92)	(1.70)
Dependency and cooperation with local business community	-0.0715	-0.0890*	-0.526
	(-0.87)	(-2.24)	(-1.85)
Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations	**-0.0623****	0.0108	**0.146***
	(-3.25)	(1.16)	(2.57)
Left-right self-positioning (0-10)	**-0.128*****	**-0.0559*****	0.0153
	(-12.38)	(-11.22)	(0.49)
Mayoral perception of municipal financial situation	-0.0391	-0.0102	-0.00449
	(-1.87)	(-1.04)	(-0.08)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	0.0994	**-0.0899***	-0.104
	(1.33)	(-2.51)	(-0.49)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	0.0359	-0.00742	-0.155
	(0.75)	(-0.32)	(-1.08)
Municipal population size (log.)	-0.0196	0.0139	0.190
	(-0.57)	(0.85)	(1.94)
Constant	3.766***	2.473***	
	(10.04)	(13.90)	
R^2	0.117	0.101	
Pseudo-R^2			0.015
N	1900	1903	1889

t statistics in parentheses. OLS regressions for models 1 and 2, binomial logistic regression for model 3. All models with country fixed effects (not reported).

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 10: Binomial logistic regressions explaining probability of a mayor to adhere to the single clusters (including EU-orientation as control for all models)

	(1) Cluster_1: Limited-sectoral	(2) Cluster_2: Sectoral-interventionist	(3) Cluster_3: Integrated
Openness to community involvement	**-0.0549****	0.0144	**0.0440***
	(-2.66)	(0.58)	(2.01)
Dependency and cooperation with local business community	0.299	0.00175	-0.363
	(1.47)	(0.01)	(-1.57)
Dependency and cooperation with EU and supranational organisations	-0.0148	**-0.191*****	**0.165****
	(-0.31)	(-3.31)	(3.29)
Left-right self-positioning (0-10)	**0.187*****	**-0.302*****	0.0300
	(7.00)	(-9.20)	(1.08)
Mayoral perception of municipal financial situation	0.0732	0.00439	-0.0672
	(1.42)	(0.07)	(-1.27)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	-0.148	0.148	0.0114
	(-0.78)	(0.69)	(0.06)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	-0.154	**0.309***	-0.0521
	(-1.31)	(2.14)	(-0.42)
Municipal population size (log.)	**-0.242****	0.109	**0.191***
	(-2.80)	(1.09)	(2.17)
Pseudo-R^2	0.040	0.067	0.015
N	1784	1781	1789

t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported).
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$