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Towards the 'just city'?

Exploring the attitudes of European city mayors

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Abstract

After decades of equity oriented urban policies, the advent of neo-liberalism and the more recent great recession have led to their successive dismantling. On the other hand, these developments, coupled with continuing massive immigration, have led to a call for a 'just city' agenda (Fainstein, 2010) where policies and planning are directed towards equity, diversity and citizen participation rather than growth and cultural protectionism. Given the difficult economic and social environment, however, it is not clear whether such an agenda finds political support even at the level of cities.

In this paper, we put forward both a descriptive and an explanatory research question. Firstly, can we find local political support for the 'just city' ideal in Europe? Secondly, what are the local conditions conducive to embracing this ideal? Building on a recent European survey of city mayors, we present a first assessment of local orientations towards the 'just city'. Our cluster-analysis reveals a substantial share of favourably inclined mayors spread unequally across European countries. Capitalizing on subnational variation in mayoral attitudes, our multivariate regressions confirm a strong positive association with leftist party ideology, while also identifying favourable conditions for Christian and conservative mayors (medium-sized cities, low influence of the business sector). Strong voluntary associations, in contrast, are rather associated with participatory and egalitarian mayoral attitudes, but not with a positive stance towards diversity. Moreover, the positive predisposition of leftist mayors seems to wain with increasing dependency on EU funding. The exploratory study thus opens new avenues for further research.

Keywords

Introduction

Social injustice in the city has long been a characteristic of advanced urban societies. From the workhouses of industrialising European cities in the mid-19th century, through post war inequalities that were addressed through the establishment of the welfare state, to mass social housing programmes in the 1960s, social injustices, and policies to address them, have been on the political agenda of cities for some two centuries. Despite the benefits of these policies for addressing social justice in the city, it has been argued that, from the 1980s, the rise of the so-called 'neo-liberal city' has exacerbated social divisions and broadened urban inequalities over the past 40 years. Through a combination of de-industrialisation, the rise of post-Fordism, the erosion of the welfare state, and the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, European urban areas are facing severe economic and social pressures that continue to threaten the goal of social justice in the city, or in other words, the ideal of 'The just city' (Fainstein, 2010).

Even though urban policies are to some extent formulated and shaped at national and even EU levels, it is at the level of cities were these growing social divisions and spatial inequalities are most directly felt. It is also at the level of cities where elected politicians and officials make important day-to-day decisions in implementing these policies and steering urban development: Should public funds be directed towards the tourist waterfront or rather towards improving public housing conditions for a peripheral neighbourhood? Should housing and zoning policies aim for socially-mixed neighbourhoods? Today, these local choices are taken in an environment of fiscal stress and widespread anti-immigrant sentiment. Yet to date we know very little about local officials' stances on these questions. And we know nothing about their attitudes towards the ideal of the 'just city' more generally.

In this explorative study, we take a bottom-up perspective on urban policies across Europe, focusing on local political leaders, the city mayors, and their attitudes towards the policies that we see as conducive to the 'just city'. Our analysis pursues a twofold aim, a more descriptive one, and an explanatory one. The descriptive research question is stated as follows: can we find local political support for the 'just city' ideal in Europe? The explanatory research question reads: what are the local conditions conducive to embracing this ideal?

Of course, a general local political support for the just city does not necessarily translate into corresponding actions. Local authorities may lack the necessary legal and financial means as well as a supportive national policy environment. Nonetheless, favourable attitudes towards the just city ideal clearly constitute a necessary precondition from which local public action may follow. Therefore, we believe that the investigation of mayoral attitudes and their conditioning factors offers a valuable starting point for identifying fertile grounds for building the 'just cities' of tomorrow.

The paper is structured as follows. We first elaborate on the criteria of the 'just city' ideal as developed by urban scholar Susan Fainstein (2010), before presenting hypotheses on the role of local conditions and European funding opportunities for explaining local variation in political support for corresponding policies. Based on a recent European survey of city mayors (POLLEADER II) we then investigate mayoral clusters and their distribution across European countries. In a next step, we perform multivariate regression analyses for testing our hypotheses at the level of cities. We conclude with observations on cities led by mayors supporting the 'just city' ideal, and call for further research to study local and national specificities in more depth, to understand political processes that could lead to just city policies in the future.

The 'just city'

What constitutes a just city and how to arrive there are, of course, highly contested issues. If we take John Rawls' (1971) classical theory of justice as a point of departure, we can conceive of a society as fair and just, if people would have accepted existing societal conditions in the 'original position', under the 'veil of ignorance', not knowing their individual traits such as skills, physical conditions, gender, ethnicity, health or employment status. In contrast to utilitarian conceptions, the focus shifts from aggregate welfare to distributional considerations, making sure that individual opportunities and satisfaction of the least-advantaged members of society are not constrained by policies simply aiming at maximizing the total sum of satisfaction or 'the greatest happiness of the greatest number'. Even though Rawls' liberal theory of justice does not specifically take urban or spatial issues into consideration, it has become the common starting point of much theorization on social justice in the city, most prominently in 'The just city' by Susan Fainstein (2010) from an urban planning perspective, and in 'Seeking spatial justice' by urban geographer Edward Soja (2010).

Clearly, such place-based revisionist concepts of social justice have been criticized from the Marxist side for assuming that social justice can coexist with the current global capitalist order, neglecting the need for constant struggle and a more profound transformation of relations of production (e.g., Harvey and Potter, 2009; Souza, 2011). Both Fainstein and Soja put forward non-Marxist formulations of social justice for pragmatic reasons: they are concerned with correcting the most pressing social injustices under existing social frameworks, enabling broad political coalitions and inciting more radical reforms at local, intermediary and global scales over time (Fainstein, 2010: 18; Soja, 2011: 100).

In this paper, we build heavily on Susan Fainstein's (2010) encompassing elaboration of both the theoretical underpinnings of 'the just city' and the policies and planning practices that she judges as conducive to it. Most notably, she proposes three criteria of social justice – equity, diversity and democracy – and related principles to guide policy and planning that we have summarized in the first two columns of Table 1. Similar criteria were also highlighted by Fincher and Iveson (2008), and their inter-relationships with questions of social cohesion, social mobility and economic performance have also been investigated for 14 'hyper-diversified' cities across Europe (Taşan-Kok et al., 2017).

For Fainstein, *equity*, as her preferred criterion of social justice, "refers to a distribution of both material and nonmaterial benefits derived from public policy that does not favour those who are already better off at the beginning" (Fainstein, 2010: 36). This criterion is motivated by the view that deindustrialization and globalization have led city leaders to focus narrowly on growth-promoting policies serving the interests of developers and downtown businesses, while neglecting the needs of peripheral neighbourhoods and depriving disadvantaged population groups of housing and employment opportunities (Fainstein, 2010: 1–3). Rather than bridging the perceived trade-off between growth and equity through investment in schools and qualification programmes, politicians would prefer to undertake 'hard' expenditure in buildings and infrastructure for the sake of visible short-term outcomes (Fainstein, 2010: 81).

Although acknowledging the equity implications of the broader spectrum of public policies, Fainstein's discussion of just city planning principles centres mainly on housing and urban regeneration (Fainstein, 2010: 172–173). As for the US, she condemns the continued

reliance on home ownership programmes for the middle class and stigmatizing public housing for the poorest. Regarding Europe, she laments the privatization and demolition of the mass-produced public housing stock. While Fainstein welcomes the trend towards mixed-income developments and rent supplements in both contexts, she cautions that the retreat of the state leads to stronger dependence on market forces and possible discrimination through private owners (Fainstein, 2010: 77–80). She therefore calls for stronger government involvement in the housing market, complemented with an incremental reconstruction of neighbourhoods, making a "kind of justice impact statement when choosing particular strategies" and preventing the mass-displacement of low-income residents (Fainstein, 2010: 166, 175–178).

With her second criterion of social justice, *diversity*, Fainstein borrows from the post-structuralist critique that liberal individualism would fail to account for nonmaterial forms of oppression caused by group-based difference (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, religion, and culture). She cites Iris Marion Young, stating that "[s]ocial justice requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression" (1990, 47, cited in Fainstein, 2010: 43). Following Young, emancipation requires the rejection of the assimilationist model and the possibility for a social group to define its own identity rather than one being imposed from outside (Fainstein, 2010: 43). In terms of housing policies, it seems counter-productive to force relocation of residents into a possibly hostile environment (Fainstein, 2010: 74–75). Instead, land use policies are to restrict new constructions furthering segregation of neighbourhoods and schools, while allowing for voluntary ethnic enclaves provided that the boundaries remain porous (Fainstein, 2010: 68, 76, 174).

Fainstein's third criterion, *democracy*, she sees as valuable for social justice only as far as it helps achieve the substantial criteria of equity and diversity, and she makes clear that the potential of democracy has been overstated in the literature on participatory and deliberative planning. Participatory mechanisms, in her view, have become a vehicle for middle-class interests, thereby democratizing bureaucratic planning processes but not in the direction of redistribution. Moreover, the legitimacy of neighbourhood activists claiming to represent a broad constituency has always been suspect to her, and if they are not backed by widespread mobilization they would be unlikely to make a difference (Fainstein, 2010: 66–67).

Democratic theory more broadly has, in Fainstein's view, failed to show how to ensure "adequate representation of all interests in a large, socially divided group, protecting against demagoguery, achieving more than token public participation, preventing economically or institutionally powerful interests from defining the agenda, and maintaining minority rights" (Fainstein, 2010: 29). If politics in culturally divided societies is based on coalitions, she asks, how can we expect social emancipation to come from a "coalition of out-groups that share little but their antagonism to the extant social hierarchy?" (Fainstein, 2010: 52). Social programmes, she concludes, depend on a combination of pressure from below, political-bureaucratic receptiveness at national and local level, and majoritarian support by the broader public and by centre-left coalitions in the case of Europe. Accordingly, social programmes and redevelopment policies were often based on coalitions involving down-town business and conservative segments of the population, resulting in suburbanization and further segregation (Fainstein, 2010: 167–168).

Table 1: Criteria of social justice after Fainstein (2010) and items used for assessing local political support

Criteria of social justice	Principles of just urban policy and planning	Survey items (POLLEADER II)
Equity/ redistribution	Resolve the trade-off between growth and equity in favour of social benefits and investment in human capital • *Housing*: mixed-income housing developments, preserved pool of affordable housing units, regulated housing market, public subsidies, public ownership, land banking policies • *Land use/urban renewal*: densification yet incremental reconstruction of neighbourhoods, limiting involuntary displacement of low-income people, require direct benefits to low-income people • *Public services and amenities*: affordable public transportation, high quality public schools, accessible health services and facilities	*Policy agenda placing high priority to*: B. "To develop social policies to secure adequate housing, health care, education, public transport facilities and take care of the needs of vulnerable groups (the elderly, the young, the unemployed etc.)" • *Disagreement with statement*: "The market is the best way to attend housing needs" • *Importance of development strategy*: G. "anticipate the environmental and social impacts of projects" • *Preferred form of service delivery (public rather than public-private-partnership or private)*: Public transport, maintenance of school buildings, hospitals, care homes for the elderly *Rather than policy agenda placing high priority to*: G. "To stimulate economic growth and employment"
Diversity/ recognition	Promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression, rather than forcing assimilation • *Housing*: No forced relocations of residents for the purpose of diversity but prevent exclusion based on gender, ethnicity, homelessness etc. • *Land use/urban renewal*: Restrict constructions furthering segregation, inclusionary zoning, porous boundaries between districts • *Public space*: ample and varied public space accessible for all • *Social programmes*: affirmative action in housing, education, employment	*Policy agenda placing high priority to*: I. "To improve the integration of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities and emphasize diversity and tolerance in the local community" *Rather than to*: F. "To preserve the local identity and the locality's traditional lifestyle"
Democracy	Citizen participation with fair representation of interests of disadvantaged groups • Groups that are not able to participate directly should be represented by advocates • Development of plans in consultation with target population, yet city-wide considerations must also apply • Broad consultation for developing plans for uninhabited or sparsely occupied areas	• *Disagreement with*: Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies • *Agreement with*: Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives • *Importance of development strategy*: E. "Involve local society in defining territorial priorities"

Assessment of local political support for the just city

Given Fainstein's scepticism towards elected politicians and participatory arrangements, she puts her hopes into urban planners and advises them to use their expertise against their 'political masters', presenting who gets the benefits and who bears the costs, making use of deliberative arrangements and citizen activism by pressing for egalitarian and inclusive solutions while blocking contrary proposals (Fainstein, 2010: 173, 181). Yet Fainstein is well aware that it takes supportive elected officials for urban planners to assume such a role and for a just city vision to be actually implemented – in the field of planning, and even more so in the field of social policies.

Here we deliberately focus on the side of the potential political support that justice-oriented planners and public officials might receive from political urban leaders. Even though there has been comparative research on policy orientations of political elites across Europe, this paper marks the first effort to engage specifically with the concept of the just city in policy making and planning. More specifically, we draw from the POLLEADER II survey (Heinelt et al., 2018), directed to all mayors of cities with more than 10,000 inhabitants in 28 countries across Europe (average response rate of 39%) questioned between the years 2015 and 2016.

Based on the survey items listed in the third column of Table 1, we have built three indices for evaluating mayoral attitudes against the normative framework by Fainstein. One for favouring equity over growth, another for favouring diversity over assimilation, and the third for participatory democracy.[1] The exact phrasing of the survey items and the applied aggregation rules can be found in the appendix (Tables 5 and 6).

The first two indices are differential measures for the degree to which just city orientations dominate over the concern for either growth, or for identity and traditional lifestyle – the assimilationist model. High values on these two indices thus indicate a rather favourable relation, whereas low values indicate a relative domination of concerns for growth or cultural protectionism, respectively. In practice, of course, mayors need not perceive these two suggested ends as a trade-off and may indicate high or low values on both, resulting in an intermediate position on these scales. The purpose of the scales is uniquely to identify mayors with clear preferences on the alternatives implied in the concept of the just city.

Rather than relying on the three indices alone, we perform a cluster analysis in order to identify types of mayors depending on how they combine the three indices. This is

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[1] For the dependent variable 'equity over growth', the initial step was a factor analysis of four items (importance of developing social policies on the policy agenda, public service delivery, role of the market for attending housing needs, importance of anticipating the environmental and social impacts of project). From this analysis, one factor could be retained with an Eigenvalue above 1. It was standardized to a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. Finally, the priority of the agenda 'To stimulate economic growth and employment', likewise standardized to the range 0 to 100 was subtracted from the factor and the resulting variable was standardized again to the range -50 to +50.
For the dependent variable 'diversity', the agenda priority of 'preserving the local identity and the locality's traditional lifestyle' was subtracted from the agenda priority of 'improving the integration of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities and emphasizing diversity and tolerance in the local community'. Resulting values were standardized to the range -50 to +50.
The dependent variable 'participatory democracy' has been the result of a factor analysis with three items (citizen involvement apart from voting, citizen involvement before important local decisions are made, citizen involvement in defining important territorial priorities). From this analysis, one factor could be retained with an Eigenvalue above 1. It was standardized to a minimum of -50 and a maximum of 50.

important, since a just city agenda requires the "maximization of the three values" of equity, diversity and democracy (Fainstein, 2010: 166). Political support for the just city would imply at least a slight preference for equity and diversity as compared to growth and assimilation respectively, possibly complemented with a positive predisposition towards empowered participation of affected residents.

As is true of any analysis of survey data, we need to be aware of possible biases. Survey data might be biased due to the self-selection of survey participants. Also, there will be biased responses due to 'social desirability' (DeMaio, 1984). Some items relating to the concept of the just city might be particularly prone to misreporting biases, as has been shown for policies touching upon immigration and socially progressive attitudes (Funk, 2016). In the absence of readily available alternative sources on mayoral preferences (or actions), we will proceed with the necessary caution when interpreting the results.

Working hypotheses

Our study is explorative in that we are interested to identify local political support for a just city agenda and to demarcate such inclinations from other possible political orientations, and to find distributional patterns across Europe as well as within single countries. Underlying our study is the general assumption, that the strong competition between cities, continuing fiscal pressures in several countries and growing anti-immigrant sentiments will be favouring local concerns for growth and a cultural protectionist attitude, yet that there might be cities resisting such general trends by embracing the ideals of the just city. At the level of cross-national differences in mayoral attitudes, we limit ourselves to a descriptive analysis, where discussion of possible factors contributing to distributional patterns must remain necessarily fluid. There is a range of possible factors, beginning with national welfare state traditions (Esping-Andersen, 1990), conceptions of citizenship (Koopmans, 2005), level of economic development, dominant political ideology, degree and form of decentralisation, possible trends of Europeanization (Olsen, 2002), current national reforms, fiscal crises following the great recession of 2008, and many more. With only 28 countries, it is impossible to disentangle the precise effect of these often highly correlated factors. Instead, our more systematic analyses focus on the city level, exploiting the leverage offered by over 1000 observations spread across these countries.

Our *first set of working hypotheses* for explaining the variation of just city orientations between European cities focuses on the role of political ideologies. Firstly, we expect leftist mayors to combine a concern for equity and diversity, the two central criteria for a just city, as opposed to mayors positioning themselves rather on the political right. Previous research on mayoral agendas showed a clear correspondence between leftist political orientations and the pursuit of agendas focusing on problem-solving and social sustainability, while right wing mayors were more likely to follow agendas focusing on growth and preserving the local community (Cabria et al., 2018; Magnier et al., 2006). In fact, going beyond the simple left-right scale, research on national party positions across Europe (Kitschelt, 1994) has confirmed for leftist parties both a pro-state position on the economic dimension (as opposed to pro-market), as well as a liberal view on a so-called cultural dimension (as opposed to a traditional authoritarian perspective). These two dimensions of the political space in European countries, which have arguably been reinforced with globalization and European integration (Kriesi et al., 2006), quite nicely correspond to the axes of equity vs. growth and diversity vs. ethnic protectionism considered in the conceptualization of the just city. Since the cultural dimension at the national scale even subsumes the participatory and anti-authoritarian values introduced

with the social movements of the 1960s, we might expect mayors from leftist parties to support all three components of the just city: equity, diversity and participatory democracy.

Secondly, and as suggested by Susan Fainstein, conservative Christian politicians in Europe may also be involved in centre-left coalitions pushing for some, possibly more restrained, forms of equitable policies at the national and local level. Accordingly, we might hypothesise a stronger alignment to the just city ideal by Christian and conservative mayors as compared to their colleagues standing further to the political right. Of course, Christian and conservative politicians in Europe cannot be regarded as a homogenous group, so we will certainly find Christian and conservative mayors varying on the left-right self-positioning as well as in their attitudes towards equity, diversity and participatory democracy. Again, making recourse to research on national party positions across Europe, Christian and conservative parties would be expected to take a middle stance on both the economic and the cultural dimension (Kriesi et al., 2006). We would expect then the attitudes of mayors from liberal parties to be positioned further away from the just city ideal, 'liberal' being understood in its more conservative variant, common in the European context (as opposed to a centre-left variant associated with liberalism in North America). Even if these may surpass Christian and conservative party members in terms of cultural openness, as confirmed in the political party literature, their decidedly market-oriented attitudes would stand in direct conflict with state regulations directed towards equity. We would expect mayors from right wing parties to be the most averse to the just city ideal, given their decidedly culturally protectionist and possibly more authoritarian stance, often coupled with a marked-oriented position on the economic dimension (cp. Kriesi et al., 2006).

The *second set of working hypotheses* is concerned with local power structures possibly conditioning the attitudes of mayors, apart from their political party membership. The alleged shift from government to governance has meant that a multiplicity of actors from the political, administrative, economic and social sphere are involved in developing, deciding and implementing urban planning and urban policies (Le Galès, 2002; da Cruz et al., 2019). Drawing from urban governance approaches and urban regime theory, we would expect that mayoral agendas are to some extent dependent on local power structures as well as on the way urban political leaders decide to mobilize and involve particular stakeholders and population groups in urban policy making and planning. More progressive and redistributive urban policy agendas require broad governing coalitions involving not only the business sector, but also broad segments of the society such as strong voluntary associations (Pierre, 2011; Stone, 1989). Accordingly, we would regard a strong reported political influence by voluntary associations to indicate a local political context favourable for sustaining more ambitious mayoral policy attitudes with regard to the just city, including equity, growth and participatory democracy. Conversely, a strong reported influence by the local business sector would rather seem to sustain growth-oriented mayoral attitudes, less concerned with issues of equity, diversity and citizen participation.

Additionally, we formulate a *working hypothesis* on European funding opportunities and differential processes of Europeanization depending on a city's engagement with European cohesion programmes (Carpenter, 2013; Hamedinger and Wolffhardt, 2010). Processes of 'download' Europeanization suggest that EU policies can affect domestic policies, practices and preferences following the implementation of EU programmes (Marshall, 2005). However, the actual impact of Europeanization will depend in part on the policy 'misfit' between the EU and local levels, where adaptational pressures might lead to domestic policy transformation through processes of convergence (Börzel and Risse, 2000). The European Union encourages integrated programs and locally empowering projects

directed towards deprived neighbourhoods and discriminated minorities – very much in line with the just city ideal – both within the European Structural and Investment Funds as well as within the Pre-accession Assistance schemes – even if with variable success (see Atkinson, 2015; Scheurer and Haase, 2018). Support from EU funding opportunities could therefore have an influence on a mayor's attitudes to just city policies, because of his or her interaction with the principles of social justice that are embedded within EU funding programmes.

Besides individual control variables regarding age, gender and education, we also account for city characteristics possibly related to the mayoral attitudes under consideration. Regarding the impact of the financial crisis of 2008, Fainstein at her time was cautious of making any interpretations. Even though she observed protests and riots in some cities, they had not transposed into larger disturbances, and much would depend on the "ideological framework through which the crisis is interpreted" (Fainstein, 2010: 182). Next to the fiscal situation of a city, we also account for population size and city type: issues of equity, diversity and participatory democracy may be more pressing or more amenable depending on its position in the urban hierarchy, ranging from large urban centres, the wider agglomeration and more peripheral areas.

Mayoral Clusters and Cross-National Patterns

Based on the three indices equity, diversity and participatory democracy, we have identified four mayoral clusters, depicting their characteristic positioning in this three dimensional space (cp. Figure 1).[2] Specifically, we find one cluster of mayors that most closely corresponds to the 'just city' ideal, even though we need to be aware of possible biases due to social desirability. These mayors aim to promote diversity and tolerance rather than traditional identity and policies directed to social equity are clearly more prominent than the concern for economic growth. Moreover, there is sizeable support for participatory democracy in policymaking and planning. Mayors of the participatory cluster, in turn, are strongly committed to participatory democracy and they share the commitment to diversity, but they tend to give more weight to growth than to equity. The elitist cluster holds a similar position, except it shows the lowest inclination towards participatory democracy. The competitive cluster, as we call it, is characterized by valuing the conservation of the traditional identity higher than the value of diversity, giving growth promotion clear precedence over equity, while exposing moderate support for participatory democracy.

On the grounds of the cluster analysis and the frequency table by country (Table 2), we are now in a position to check our general assumption regarding the propensity of just city orientations of urban political leaders across Europe. Contrary to our cautious expectation, we do find substantial shares of political urban leaders that tend to favour policies corresponding to the just city ideal, although the share varies widely between countries, ranging from 12.5 percent to 40 percent. Here we should note that the differences between countries cannot be

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[2] We estimated the cluster analysis with Stata version 14.2 and followed the procedure suggested and outlined by Mooi et al. (2018). The squared Euclidean distance is used as the method for assessing similarity, because the variables used have a metric scale. As suggested by Milligan (1980), we first performed a hierarchical clustering method to determine the number of clusters. More specifically, we used Ward's method, a clustering approach, where groups are joined based on the error-sum-of-squares criteria. The results indicated that a four-cluster solution performs best in terms of both Duda/Hart indices computed by the program (see appendix, Table 8). We then applied an iterative partition-clustering method (K-means cluster analysis), where the number of clusters is consequently set to four. As claimed by several authors (e.g., Clatworthy et al., 2005; Mooi et al., 2018), the validity of clusters has to be established. For this purpose, we compare the clustering results from the ward's linkage analysis to the K-means cluster analysis. The results show an overlap of roughly 60 percent, which is satisfactory (see appendix, Table 9).

taken at face value, given the fact that biases due to social desirability might be more pronounced in some cultures than in others (cp. Funk, 2016). Moreover, these expressed attitudes of mayors need not correspond to the actually implemented policies in their particular city. Rather, what these measures seek to assess is the potential local political support that justice-oriented planners and public officials might receive when drafting plans and social policies, always constrained by national and regional legislation and the fiscal means available to the city.

Although we do find a general pattern of more developed economies at the top of the table and the less prosperous countries entitled to Cohesion funds and Pre-accession assistance at the lower end, we also encounter various countries punctuating this broader pattern (Table 2). On the one hand, we find surprisingly high shares in the Cohesion countries of Croatia and Hungary at the top of the table.[3] On the other hand, we also find the relatively prosperous countries of Switzerland and England at the very bottom of the table. Clearly, then, the national economic situation is only part of the story and must be related to considerations of the political ideologies in the countries under investigation. The majority of surveyed mayors of Austria, Sweden, Italy, France and Spain expressed a left wing party membership, contrasting with Switzerland with the highest share of liberal and right wing party members. In England, the neo-liberal ethos that has permeated politics and policies since the 1980s runs deep, with mayors giving high priority to economic growth rather than just city policies, excluding those cities from the 'just city' cluster.

Less obvious, however, is the explanation for the exceptionally high shares in the cohesion countries of Croatia and Hungary, both lacking widespread leftist strongholds across the cities. A closer look at the configuration of the national party systems might help explain these two cases. In Hungary, the social and economic dimensions do not correlate positively as in most European countries. In fact, on the social dimension even right-wing parties support issues from economic left-wing parties (Bakker et al., 2012: 227–230). Also in Croatia, the economic cleavage (free market vs. state intervention) is not reflected in the arena of political party competition (see Dolenec, 2012: 71). Yet even if considering national particularities in terms of both economic situation and political ideology, it remains difficult to satisfactorily explain the ordering of countries based on such general concepts.

The fact that mayors in Cohesion and Pre-accession countries only seldom aspire to the just city ideal further illustrates how EU assistance in most Cohesion countries and all Pre-accession countries considered here has not necessarily increased the willingness of urban political leaders to invest in more equitable and inclusive policies. While a lack of local support for the values of equity and inclusion might actually be hampering the success of EU Cohesion and Pre-accession policies, the result makes clear how the economy really is the most pressing problem in many of these countries.

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[3] For the case of Hungary, a pioneering socially oriented engagement in terms of EU funded urban renewal has been documented by Tosics (2011). In 2007, the relevant Hungarian ministry made a city-wide Integrated Urban Development Strategy compulsory for urban renewal actions financed through the European Regional Development Fund. The strategy has to address segregation in the city including housing, education, social and health-care facilities.

Figure 1: Single items of the four mayoral clusters (mean values)

Just City cluster

Participatory cluster

Elitist cluster

Competitive cluster

All scales have been standardized to a range from 0 to 10. Excluding Denmark and Netherlands (missing items). Top ends indicating mean values and 95% confidence intervals.

Table 2: Share of mayors assigned to various clusters by country, complemented with party memberships

Country	Just city (%)	Participatory (%)	Elitist (%)	Competitive (%)	Left wing parties (%)	Christian/ conserv. parties (%)	Liberal parties (%)	Right wing parties (%)	Other parties (%)	Total obs.	EU-Status (2014-20)
Austria	40.0	23.3	13.3	23.3	53.3	33.3	0.0	3.3	10.0	30	EU
Croatia	39.3	21.4	35.7	3.6	26.9	46.2	19.2	0.0	7.7	28	EU Cohesion country
Belgium	38.5	20.2	20.2	21.2	19.8	37.1	28.4	0.0	14.7	104	EU
Hungary	36.8	31.6	15.8	15.8	11.1	86.1	0.0	2.8	0.0	57	EU Cohesion country
Sweden	34.2	21.6	17.1	27.0	63.3	23.4	0.8	0.0	12.5	111	EU
Greece	33.7	31.4	11.6	23.3	43.9	56.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	86	EU Cohesion country
Italy	33.5	24.7	17.0	24.7	88.7	6.1	0.0	0.0	5.2	182	EU
France	32.7	18.2	21.8	27.3	94.4	0.0	0.0	5.6	0.0	55	EU
Spain	28.1	43.7	7.4	20.8	56.9	21.3	0.0	0.0	21.8	231	EU
Slovenia	25.0	25.0	35.0	15.0	16.7	25.0	0.0	0.0	58.3	20	EU Cohesion country
Czech Rep.	23.9	26.1	43.5	6.5	54.5	45.5	0.0	0.0	0.0	46	EU Cohesion country
Germany	22.0	32.9	18.8	26.3	43.6	50.6	2.5	0.0	3.2	490	EU
Portugal	20.8	50.0	23.6	5.6	55.4	44.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	72	EU Cohesion country
Poland	18.6	31.0	46.0	4.4	-	-	-	-	-	113	EU Cohesion country
Lithuania	18.5	37.0	29.6	14.8	40.0	30.0	20.0	6.7	3.3	27	EU Cohesion country
Albania	17.2	31.0	48.3	3.4	-	-	-	-	-	29	Pre-access. country
Serbia	14.3	57.1	24.5	4.1	-	-	-	-	-	49	Pre-access. country
Switzerland	13.8	28.7	25.3	32.2	31.5	21.3	31.5	14.6	1.1	87	Third country
England	12.5	29.2	45.8	12.5	43.8	56.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	24	EU
Total (abs.)	487	587	388	379	641	485	83	18	105	1841	

Countries sorted by share of mayors assigned to the 'just city' cluster. Values for Cyprus, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Norway, Romania and Slovakia not reported (low response rates with less than 20 observations). Denmark and Netherlands missing (lacking items on policy orientations). For Albania, Poland and Serbia no indication is available for party membership.

Besides general prosperity and ideological orientation, we might also consider more immediate effects of the financial crisis or sentiments currently held by the broader population. The fiscal debt crises in Greece, Italy and Spain (but not in Portugal) might have reinforced the perceived need for redistributive policies at the local and national level. Along similar lines, the nationalist or socialist populist climate in Hungary and Greece (but not Poland) might equally have fuelled popular demands for equity (yet not necessarily for diversity). Given the aggregate nature of our cross-national analysis, the multiple collinearities between explanatory variables and the absence of deterministic relationships, we are left with these suggestions to be further validated through micro-level analyses (see below) and comparative in-depth case studies (future research).

Explaining Variation between Cities

After having performed a cross-national assessment of mayoral shares adhering to the just city ideal or otherwise, let us now turn to analysing the variation that we can find within countries at the level of cities and their political leaders. In order to address our sets of hypotheses formulated above, we seek to evaluate the role of party ideology, local power structures, European funding opportunities and additional city characteristics to explain why mayors are assigned to one cluster (say, the just city cluster), rather than another cluster (say, the competitive cluster).

We thus performed a multinomial logistic regression with cluster assignment as the dependent variable, focusing on the likelihood of being assigned to the just city cluster as opposed to the three other clusters (the participatory cluster; the elitist cluster; and the competitive cluster) and the likelihood of being assigned to the participatory cluster as opposed to the competitive cluster (Table 3).[4]

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[4] According to Starkweather and Moske (2011), the method of multinomial logistic regression does not make assumptions about normality distribution, linearity or homoskedasticity. Diagnostics usually comprise tests for multicollinearity, influential and outlier cases and whether categories of the dependent variable should be combined (Williams, 2019; Long and Freese, 2006).
For assessing whether multicollinearity is a problem, we computed collinearity diagnostics as in other binary models. Two common measures for multicollinearity are the variance inflation factor (VIF) and the tolerance (Long and Freese, 2006). If both measures are 1, variables are perfectly uncorrelated. The more collinear the variables are, the higher the VIF is, and the closer the tolerance is to zero. Following this rule of thumb, only the dummy variables created from nominal-scaled variables (city type) and the interaction terms are problematic (see appendix, Table 10). Because the approach of centering for interactions and omission of variables does usually not increase "statistical certainty of the estimated effects" (see Brambor et al., 2005: 70–71), those variables do not have to be dropped.
In order to check for influential cases and potential outliers, four separate logistic regressions, one for each of the four clusters, were estimated first using Pregibon's method, a measure similar to Cook's distance known from OLS regressions (see Long and Freese, 2006: 151). In a second step, 10 observations with a value higher than 0.3 and a substantial distance from the point clouds were excluded for all further analysis. A special test developed for multinomial logistic regressions answers the question whether two of the outcomes (i.e. clusters) are indistinguishable with respect to the variables in the model. If yes, estimates that are more efficient could result from combining them (Long and Freese, 2006: 239–243). The results of this test show that no categories should be combined (see appendix, Table 11).

Table 3: Multinomial logistic regression results

	(1) Just city vs. participatory	(2) Just city vs. elitist	(3) Just city vs. competitive	(4) Participatory vs. competitive
Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ conservative)				
- left wing	**0.799***	**0.968***	**2.045***	**1.246***
	(3.85)	(4.64)	(8.32)	(5.59)
- liberal	-0.578	-0.107	-0.859	-0.281
	(-1.24)	(-0.22)	(-1.91)	(-0.79)
- right wing	0.0872	0.0363	-16.33	-16.41
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(-0.01)	(-0.01)
- other	-0.944	-0.878	-0.567	0.378
	(-1.94)	(-1.82)	(-1.13)	(1.17)
Age	0.0132	0.00361	0.0175	0.00432
	(1.35)	(0.36)	(1.51)	(0.41)
Gender	-0.393	0.0678	-0.426	-0.0333
	(-1.51)	(0.27)	(-1.33)	(-0.11)
Education	-0.254	-0.0998	0.0411	0.295
	(-1.58)	(-0.64)	(0.23)	(1.72)
Influence of voluntary associations (1-5)	-0.0138	0.141	**0.330***	**0.344****
	(-0.12)	(1.20)	(2.45)	(2.79)
Influence of local businessmen (1-5)	-0.136	-0.0373	-0.234	-0.0979
	(-1.20)	(-0.32)	(-1.74)	(-0.79)
Dependency and cooperation with EU (1-5)	**-0.311***	**-0.276***	**-0.235****	0.0760
	(-4.01)	(-3.51)	(-2.63)	(0.94)
Perceived state of municipal finances (1-5)	0.0346	-0.0490	-0.0269	-0.0615
	(0.39)	(-0.55)	(-0.26)	(-0.67)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)				
- core city of larger functional urban area	2.693	**7.853***	**10.86****	**8.164***
	(0.79)	(2.17)	(2.68)	(2.31)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	3.674	3.849	3.412	-0.261
	(1.01)	(1.02)	(0.77)	(-0.07)
Municipal population size (log.)	-0.422	0.0540	-0.0129	0.409
	(-1.87)	(0.22)	(-0.05)	(1.83)
- core city x population size	-0.174	**-0.677***	**-0.951***	**-0.777***
	(-0.54)	(-1.96)	(-2.48)	(-2.36)
- commuting zone x population size	-0.329	-0.369	-0.303	0.0264
	(-0.90)	(-0.97)	(-0.68)	(0.07)
Constant	4.888*	-0.694	-0.881	-5.770*
	(2.06)	(-0.28)	(-0.32)	(-2.44)
N	1057	1057	1057	1057

t statistics in parentheses. $^{*}p < 0.05$, $^{**}p < 0.01$, $^{***}p < 0.001$. Missing data for five countries (see Table 2).

As expected from the literature on national party positions on the economic and cultural dimension, we find that mayors with a left wing party affiliation have a significantly higher likelihood to be assigned to the just city cluster than mayors from the Christian democratic and conservative reference group (positive coefficients in models 1 through 3

in Table 3). This relatively higher probability holds whether we take the participatory, elitist or competitive cluster as the base for comparing the likelihood. This finding is hardly surprising, given the fact that leftist parties' manifestos usually emphasise the desirability of redistributive and inclusive policies. Admittedly, this same fact hints towards possibly biased coefficients due to a group-specific social desirability effect (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). In other words, leftist mayors might exaggerate their support for policies that are in line with their parties' manifestoes. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the full effect is only due to biased responses. As a general rule, we can assume that mayors of leftist parties indeed do embrace their parties' positions more strongly than would be the case for mayors from centre or right wing parties.

On the other hand, we had expected a negative effect of right wing membership, exposing relatively higher probabilities for being assigned to the base clusters, particularly to the competitive cluster (model 3). Equally, members of liberal parties do not significantly differ in their assignment probabilities as compared to their Christian democratic and conservative peers. In contrast, left wing party membership also explains why mayors pertain to the participatory cluster as opposed to the competitive cluster (model 4) – although the participatory cluster, as we know, lacks the decisive support for equity over growth that characterizes the just city cluster.

A separate OLS regression (see appendix, Table 7) shows that party families do spread on the single dimensions very much in line with the political party literature. Left wing membership is associated positively with a preference for equity, diversity and democracy, while liberal mayors have a significant preference for growth (but not for diversity) and right wing mayors have a significant preference for both identity and growth. The Christian democratic and conservative mayors (reference category) lie somewhere in between the other groups with regard to the equity and diversity dimension. Yet as demonstrated above, only the combined preferences of leftist mayors add up to a significant association with one of the identified clusters (the just city cluster), demarcating themselves from the more diffusely located conservative, liberal and right wing mayors.

The regression models in Table 3 also offer important insights with regard to the contextual factors associated with the orientations of political urban leaders. In line with our working hypotheses on local power structures, mayors reporting stronger voluntary associations expose higher probabilities for being assigned to the just city or participatory cluster (models 3 and 4), although the positive effect is restricted to the models where the competitive cluster serves as the base. Hence a strong civil society seems only significant for reducing the likelihood of being assigned to the competitive cluster, while having no effect on the assignment between the just city and the elitist cluster (model 2), for instance. Moreover, the likelihood of a mayor supporting the just city or participatory agenda is higher in core cities of larger urban agglomerations (Table 3, models 2 through 4), even though the negative interaction effect with population size means that the smaller core cities are the most likely to favour participatory arrangements. Here, again, the comparison with the OLS regression on single dimensions (appendix, Table 7) reveals that organized societal groups mainly call for more participatory mayoral orientations and

equity, but not diversity. In contrast, a strong influence of local businesspeople is associated with a stronger mayoral preference for growth rather than equity.

Against our expectations, none of our regressions confirm an effect of the financial crisis as captured by the perceived state of municipal finances (Tables 3 and 7). Even contrary to our hypothesis, local dependency and cooperation with the EU turns out not to increase but to decrease chances for being assigned to the just city cluster: it actually increases chances for being assigned to any other cluster (Table 3, models 1 through 3). The OLS regressions on the single dimensions (Table 7, appendix) discloses the reasons for deviating from the just city cluster. Mayors engaged in EU relations tend to value growth over equity. Rather than capturing the effect of down-load Europeanization towards values of equity and inclusion, the result seems to indicate the need and entitlement for supranational financial support for promoting much needed growth and employment, thus corroborating the conclusions we already drew at the national level for EU Cohesion and Pre-accession countries (see preceding section). At the level of cities, this conclusion is even extended to cities that are not entitled to Cohesion and Pre-accession funds, but rather to some degree of EU co-financing within the more broadly accessible European Regional Development Fund and the Social Fund.

Since the effects of party ideology may interact with the further contextual factors discussed above, we also estimated logistic regression models for single subsamples split by the mayors' party affiliation, yet this time we chose to focus on a dichotomous outcome of a just city assignment versus any other assignment (Table 4). While the analyses for the few right wing city mayors and for the more numerous liberal mayors do not yield any significant associations, the reported analyses for leftist mayors and for Christian and conservative mayors respectively reveal some interesting precisions regarding distinct effects for these two political camps.

Thus, while the regression confirms that the variation within both groups is also associated with the individual self-positioning on the left-right scale, the dampening effect of a strong dependency on EU funding pertains mainly to the otherwise positively predisposed leftist mayors (model 2). On the other hand, the positive effect of (smaller) core cities appears to be mainly driven by Christian democratic and conservative mayors (model 3). For this subsample, this effect is even broader in that conservative mayors in both (smaller) core cities and (smaller) suburbs are more likely to adhere to the just city ideals, as compared to their conservative peers in more peripheral cities. A screening of the cluster assignment for cities reveals a threshold of approximately 100'000 inhabitants, on top of which no single city led by a Christian or conservative mayor adheres to the just city ideal. In Germany, for instance, this threshold captures the larger independent cities ("kreisfreie Städte"). Our interpretation is that these larger core cities – where they happen to be governed by Christian or conservative mayors, would see their task rather in strengthening their position in national and international economic competition, crowding out more socially oriented priorities that might be shared by Christian and conservative mayors in medium sized cities in the surrounding agglomeration.

Table 4: Binomial logistic regression results on mayoral adherence to just city cluster

	(1) Just city	(2) Just city (leftist mayors only)	(3) Just city (Christian/ conservative mayors only)
Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ conservative)			
- left wing	**1.292*****		
	(6.53)		
- liberal	-0.700		
	(-1.55)		
- right wing	-14.76		
	(-0.02)		
- other	-0.639		
	(-1.36)		
Left-right self-positioning		**-0.263****	**-0.463***
		(-3.24)	(-2.57)
Age	0.00414	-0.00400	-0.0201
	(0.46)	(-0.35)	(-0.83)
Gender (0=female)	-0.154	-0.108	15.92
	(-0.67)	(-0.38)	(0.01)
Education	-0.110	0.0103	0.912
	(-0.80)	(0.06)	(1.87)
Influence of voluntary associations (1-5)	0.152	0.0419	0.511
	(1.36)	(0.28)	(1.94)
Influence of local businessmen (1-5)	-0.110	-0.0537	**-0.528***
	(-1.05)	(-0.39)	(-1.97)
Dependency and cooperation with EU (1-5)	**-0.198****	**-0.262****	-0.304
	(-2.60)	(-2.73)	(-1.57)
Perceived state of municipal finances (1-5)	0.0342	-0.00231	0.368
	(0.42)	(-0.02)	(1.67)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	5.789	4.434	**24.84***
	(1.73)	(0.93)	(2.22)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	3.387	-1.009	**21.45***
	(1.05)	(-0.25)	(2.11)
Municipal population size (log.)	-0.193	-0.128	-0.114
	(-0.91)	(-0.48)	(-0.21)
- core city x population size	-0.485	-0.386	**-2.193***
	(-1.52)	(-0.87)	(-2.08)
- commuting zone x population size	-0.309	0.120	**-2.189***
	(-0.95)	(0.30)	(-2.08)
N	1046	482	308

t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Missing data for five countries (see notes under Table 2).

Additionally, the separate estimation shows a new negative effect of influential local businesspeople for Christian and conservative mayors – thus expanding the effect we previously found for the dimension of equity versus growth (Table 7). The finding thus suggests that Christian democratic and conservative mayors in particular seem to be receptive to the circumstance of a strong business community when expressing their attitudes towards the just city. The perceived influence of voluntary associations, once again, does not show any significant associations when looking specifically at the assignment to the just city cluster.

Conclusions and Directions for Further Research

In this contribution, we set out to investigate the local political support for just city policies as captured through the single most important political city representative – the city mayor. Starting from the three criteria of social justice and the principles of just urban planning and policies as envisioned by Susan Fainstein (2010), we succeeded in presenting a first assessment of mayoral orientations towards the just city. Moreover, we were able to identify a substantial cluster of European mayors combining strong preferences for equity, diversity and participatory democracy – most clearly contrasting with mayors from the competitive cluster giving precedence to growth and cultural protectionism instead.

While the descriptive analysis of cross-national variations offered limited insights to the contextual factors of mayoral orientations, our explanatory regression analyses at city level yielded striking results, partially confirming and partially falsifying our initial expectations. Although mayors affiliated to different party families mirror the party positions identified in research on the dimensionality of the European political landscape, clear distinctions between left wing, Christian/conservative, liberal and right wing politicians arise only when single dimensions are looked at independently from each other. Once we account for the combination of the three dimensions in terms of our four clusters, the differentiation dissolves into the distinction between left wing mayors with heightened likelihood for assignment to the just city cluster, and all other mayors, spread less systematically along the participatory, elitist and competitive clusters.

Additionally, we find that local power structures beyond the city hall are to some extent related to mayoral orientations. However, strong civil societies merely decrease the likelihood of the assignment to the competitive cluster since it seems to bolster participatory and egalitarian mayoral orientations while being more ambiguous in its effect on the official stance towards diversity and tolerance. Moreover, we find that the perception of an influential business community is negatively associated with a mayoral preoccupation with equity and – in the case of Christian and conservative mayors – with the adherence to the just city ideal more broadly. To some extent, these results resonate with Fainstein's scepticism towards participatory arrangements and broader coalitions involving business and conservative segments of the population.

The urban hierarchy also plays a role, with mayors in smaller core cities being less likely to endorse the competitive or elitist policy agenda. Christian and conservative mayors in particular seem to be more open to the just city agenda when located in larger

urban agglomerations rather than in more remote cities, even though other agendas come to the top when located in cities with more than 100'000 inhabitants. No clear effect is found for the municipal fiscal situation, yet – our most surprising finding – leftist mayors in cities accessing European funding are less likely to adhere to a just city agenda, given their preoccupation with creating growth and employment.

Although mayors engaging with the EU might rightly be concerned with growth and creating job opportunities, balancing these economic aims with more social considerations in these same cities appears as an important task for the various EU funding schemes. Despite enduring efforts of strengthening the urban dimension in EU cohesion policies and of enforcing integrated and locally empowering instruments of urban renewal and diversity management (Atkinson, 2015; Scheurer and Haase, 2018), our analyses indicate a continued sectoral and one-sided – competitiveness-oriented – approach that is often pursued by local authorities making use of the funding opportunities offered by the European Union. Of course, our assessment is limited to the expressed position of mayors, so it may well be that the actual implementation of EU programmes does indeed serve their purpose of equity and diversity, even if mayoral attitudes are left unchanged.

So, relating back to the rationale motivating this research paper: where are the fertile grounds for realizing the just cities of tomorrow? The answer seems clear: we find these in cities governed by the left, as well as under favourable conditions in cities governed by Christian or conservative parties. Although the actual adoption and successful implementation will be greatly facilitated in a context of economic prosperity and relevant local competences and capacities, we should not easily discard the seeds for creatively developing more equity and diversity oriented urban policies that have evidently spread even under less favourable or even crisis-prone conditions. It is exactly under these conditions, that equity and diversity sensitive policies are most needed. Mixed-income housing developments, social impact assessments and high quality public schools and services, coupled with societal openness and non-discrimination towards immigrants and minorities, would arguably contribute to the creation of economically resilient local communities (Taşan-Kok et al., 2017).

More research is necessary for assessing and understanding commitment to and enactment of just city policies more thoroughly. Detailed case studies in which the actual policy-making of just policies or city plans is analysed in detail, including all relevant actors involved, their interests and the role of the political-institutional context, could provide additional insights. Since a variety of factors influence the concrete policies, a method like process-tracing might be helpful to disentangle the contribution of each of them. The selection of case study cities would stretch across the political spectrum, both within and between countries, with the research applying a mixed methods approach to capture not only the attitudes through the survey data, but also reactions to implemented urban policies, to explore the conjuncture of factors which affect the support for just city policies.

In particular, it would be interesting to explore further the finding here related to leftist mayors in cities accessing European funding who, it appears, are less likely to

support the just city agenda. A more in-depth qualitative approach could tease out the complexities of the intersection between political party affiliation, attitudes towards the just city, the use of particular EU funding schemes and the implementation of just city policies, including an analysis of the broader local politico-institutional context in which the mayor is embedded. Such research could further our understanding of how and where the just cities of tomorrow could be realised.

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Appendix

Table 5: Operationalization, question wording and scale of independent variables (POLLEADER II)

Variable name	Question wording	Scale
Member of party family:	Are you presently a party member? If you answered «yes» to the previous question: of which party? Each answer was assigned by country experts to one of 13 categories according to a scheme of European party families developed by Andersson et al. (2014): Communist parties; Left-socialist parties; Social democratic parties; Green parties; Agrarian parties; Regional, Separatist or ethno-nationalist parties; Liberal parties; Christian parties; Conservative parties; Right wing parties; Extreme right wing parties; Special	
- left wing political party	interest parties and others; Independent / local party. Including the four categories communist parties, left-socialist parties, social democratic parties and green parties	0=no, 1=yes
- Christian and conservative party	Including the two categories Christian parties and conservative parties	0=no, 1=yes
- liberal party	Identical with liberal party	0=no, 1=yes
- right wing	Including the two categories right wing parties and extreme right wing parties	0=no, 1=yes
- other	Summarizing the remaining categories: agrarian parties; regional, separatist or ethno-nationalist parties; special interest parties and others; independent / local party	0=no, 1=yes
Age	Age: Please write your answer	Number of years
Gender	Gender: Tick box for female or for male	0="Female" 1="Male"
Education	What is your highest completed education? Please choose only one of the following:	1="elementary school" 2="secondary school or equivalent" 3="university or equivalent"
Influence of voluntary associations	Concluding, on the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities? Please choose the appropriate response for each item… Voluntary associations	1 (no influence) to 5 (highly influence)
Influence of local businessmen	Concluding, on the basis of your experience as a Mayor in this City, and independently from the formal procedures, please indicate how influential each of the following actors are over the Local Authority activities? Please choose the appropriate response for each item…. Local businessmen	1 (no influence) to 5 (highly influence)
Dependency and cooperation with EU	If you consider this most important challenge: to what extent would you say that your administration depends	1 (no dependency) to 5 (highly dependent)

	on the cooperation and support of the different actors below in addressing this problem Dependent upon cooperation or support of… The EU and other supranational organizations	
Perceived state of municipal finances	How would describe the financial situation of your municipality? Please choose the appropriate response for each item:	1 (very poor) to 5 (very good)
City type	Location within a functional urban area/larger urban zone based on EUROSTAT 2011. Three categories have been built.	
	1="(Greater) city of a functional urban area"	0=no, 1=yes
	2="Commuting zone of a functional urban area"	0=no, 1=yes
	3="Not part of a functional urban area"	0=no, 1=yes
Municipal population size (log.)	Log transformation of number of inhabitants of each of the cities	Ranges from a minimum of 9.2 to the maximum of 14.9

Table 6: Operationalization, question wording and scale of dependent variables (POLLEADER II)

Variable name	Question wording	Scale
Equity over growth	Factor analysis of four items: • Below are a number of challenges that many municipalities are facing. For each challenge please indicate the degree to which it is an important priority on the policy agenda of you as a mayor during your current term of office: *To develop social policies to secure adequate housing, health care, education, public transport facilities and take care of the needs of vulnerable groups (the elderly, the young, the unemployed etc.)* • Public service delivery (index): Average value of four items (public transport, maintenance of school buildings, hospitals, care homes for the elderly) with theoretical minimum of 1="private sector" and maximum of 3="public sector" • Agreement to the statement "The market is the best way to attend housing needs", ranging from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree" (scale reversed) • Question about mayoral strategies: Among the following options, which strategies are in your opinion, those most likely to succeed?: *anticipate the environmental and social impacts of projects*, ranging from 0="least	-50 (growth) to +50 (equity)

	important" to 3="most important"	
	From this analysis, one factor could be retained with an Eigenvalue above 1. It was standardized to a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 100. Finally, the priority of the agenda *To stimulate economic growth and employment*, likewise standardized to the range 0 to 100 was subtracted from the factor and the resulting variable was standardized again to the range -50 to +50	
Diversity over traditional identity	A question with the following introduction was taken: Below are a number of challenges that many municipalities are facing. For each challenge please indicate the degree to which it is an important priority on the policy agenda of you as a mayor during your current term of office. A score of 1 indicates a "Low priority" and a score of 5 indicates the "High priority". Please choose the appropriate response for each item: Finally, the agenda priority of *To preserve the local identity and the locality's traditional lifestyle* was subtracted from the agenda priority of *To improve the integration of ethnic, religious or cultural minorities and emphasize diversity and tolerance in the local community.* Resulting values were standardized to the range -50 to +50	-50 (traditional identity) to +50 (diversity)
Participatory democracy	Factor analysis of three items: • Agreement with the statement *Apart from voting, citizens should not be given the opportunity to influence local government policies* ranging from 1="strongly agree" to 5="strongly disagree" (scale reversed) • Agreement with the statement *Residents should have the opportunity to make their views known before important local decisions are made by elected representatives* ranging from 1="strongly disagree" to 5="strongly agree" • Question about mayoral strategies: Among the following options, which strategies are in your opinion, those most likely to succeed?: *involve local society in defining territorial priorities*, ranging from 0="least important" to 3="most important" Finally, resulting values were standardized to the range -50 to 50	-50 (democracy least important) to +50 (democracy most important)

Table 7: OLS regression models on mayoral orientations towards single dimensions of a just city

	(1) Equity over growth	(2) Diversity over traditional identity	(3) Participatory democracy
Party affiliation (reference: Christian/ conservative)			
- left wing	10.04***	5.830***	5.112***
	(11.16)	(5.95)	(4.54)
- liberal	-5.148**	-0.656	1.842
	(-2.83)	(-0.33)	(0.81)
- right wing	-7.476*	-11.51**	1.871
	(-2.07)	(-2.86)	(0.41)
- other	1.573	0.00845	5.230**
	(1.02)	(0.00)	(2.69)
Age	0.0762	0.00580	-0.0453
	(1.79)	(0.12)	(-0.85)
Gender (0=female)	-0.872	-1.258	3.010*
	(-0.77)	(-1.03)	(2.13)
Education	0.622	0.845	0.936
	(0.89)	(1.11)	(1.08)
Influence of voluntary associations (1-5)	1.340*	0.726	2.298***
	(2.55)	(1.27)	(3.50)
Influence of local businessmen (1-5)	-1.262*	-0.238	-0.307
	(-2.48)	(-0.43)	(-0.48)
Dependency and cooperation with EU (1-5)	-0.952**	0.576	0.326
	(-2.62)	(1.45)	(0.71)
Perceived state of municipal finances (1-5)	0.507	-0.611	0.184
	(1.32)	(-1.47)	(0.39)
City type (reference: city beyond a larger functional urban area)			
- core city of larger functional urban area	15.35	19.06	22.99
	(1.04)	(1.20)	(1.25)
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	20.62	14.78	9.361
	(1.36)	(0.89)	(0.50)
Municipal population size (log.)	-1.160	1.980	1.220
	(-1.24)	(1.92)	(1.03)
- core city x population size	-1.169	-1.731	-2.133
	(-0.85)	(-1.16)	(-1.23)
- commuting zone x population size	-1.844	-1.529	-0.928
	(-1.21)	(-0.92)	(-0.49)
Constant	-5.381	-22.86*	-10.04
	(-0.54)	(-2.08)	(-0.80)
N	1092	1164	1119

t statistics in parentheses. All models with country fixed effects (not reported). * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Missing data for five countries (see notes under Table 2).

Table 8: Duda / Hart indices according to Ward's method (Stata 14.2)

Number of clusters	Je(2)/Je(1)	pseudo T-squared
1	0.7385	677.93
2	0.7618	390.35
3	0.7872	213.77
4	0.7794	188.17
5	0.6553	239.35
6	0.6012	214.94
7	0.7064	158.39
8	0.7476	156.95
9	0.5976	167.00
10	0.6305	170.57

Table 9: Comparison of clustering results

		K-means									
		Cluster 1		Cluster 2		Cluster 3		Cluster 4		Total	
Ward's method	Cluster 1	341	73.0	77	16.5	42	9.0	7	1.5	467	100.0
	Cluster 2	147	45.1	171	52.5	6	1.8	2	0.6	326	100.0
	Cluster 3	17	3.7	274	60.0	154	33.7	12	2.6	457	100.0
	Cluster 4	4	0.6	92	13.8	142	21.3	429	64.3	667	100.0
	Total	509		614		344		450		1917	

Table 10: Multicollinearity in the multinomial logistic regression

Variable	VIF	Tolerance
Party affiliation		
- left wing	5.00	0.20
- liberal	14.11	0.07
- right wing	1.20	0.84
- other	2.30	0.44
Age	1.04	0.96
Gender	1.04	0.96
Education	1.04	0.96
Influence of voluntary associations	1.91	0.52
Influence of local businessmen	1.33	0.75
Dependency and cooperation with EU	1.13	0.88
Perceived state of municipal finances	1.02	0.98
City type		
- core city of larger functional area	178.79	0.006
- commuting zone of larger functional urban area	372.49	0.003
Municipal population size (log.)	3.74	0.27
- core city x population size (interaction)	198.26	0.01
- commuting zone x population size (interaction)	370.89	0.00

Table 11: Test for combining dependent categories (LR test)

Alternatives		tested chi2	df	P>chi2
Just City	Participatory	85.738	17	0
Just City	Elitist	75.949	17	0
Just City	Competitive	158.294	17	0
Participatory	Elitist	27.817	17	0.047
Participatory	Competitive	77.842	17	0
Competitive	Elitist	55.04	19	0